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Presentation of the Thematic Area and the Working Paper 
 
 
This Working Paper is part of the activities of the WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network’s 
Thematic Area 3 (TA3), the Urban Water Cycle and Essential Public Services 
(http://waterlat.org/thematic-areas/ta3/). TA3 brings together academics, students, 
professionals working in the public sector, practitioners from Non Governmental 
Organizations, activists and members of civil society groups, and representatives of 
communities and users of public services, among others. The remit of this TA is broad, 
as the name suggests, but it has a strong focus on the political ecology of urban water, 
with emphasis on the politics of essential water services. Key issues addressed within this 
framework have been the neoliberalization of water services, social struggles against 
privatization and mercantilization of these services, the politics of public policy and 
management in the sector, water inequality and injustice in urban areas, and the 
contradictions and conflicts surrounding the status of water and water services as a public 
good, as a common good, as a commodity, as a citizenhip right, and more recently, as a 
human right. 
This Working Paper is the product of cooperation activities between the 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network and the Public Services International (PSI) 
(http://waterlat.org/projects/cooperation-agreement-with-the-psi/). It is composed of 
three articles focused on critical aspects of the new wave of privatization policies 
implemented worldwide, broadly speaking, since the start of the 21st Century. Two of the 
papers are based on special reports prepared by the authors for debate at the 6th World 
Water Forum, that took place in Marseille, France, on 12-17 March 2012. The third is 
also based on a report previously published in 2012. The three original reports were 
published by the Public Services International Research Unit at the University of 
Greenwich, United Kingdom (http://www.psiru.org), where our authors are based. 
The first article, by David Hall and Emanuele Lobina, examines the crucial issue 
of funding needs and “realities”, in relation to water and sanitation services. It exposes 
the myth that the private sector has been or could be the main source of funding for the 
universalization and long-term maintenance of these essential services, and demonstrates 
that historically all countries have relied fundamentally on public funding to achieve their 
goals in this sector. The authors discuss the contrasting aspects of the arguments defended 
by “orthodox” approaches, such as those supported by the International Financial 
Institutions, donor agencies, and other actors that promote different forms of 
privatization, and models based on public-sector provision and funding.  
In Article 2, the same authors explore the conflicts emerging from the 
privatization policies promoted worldwide, focusing on the roles of local and global 
private corporations. The article explores a range of conflicts arising globally around the 
control of water resources by private corporations, and the roles and strategies of 
international financial and development institutions and other global actors, including 
their roles in mopolizaing the production of knowledge about the planet’s water 
resources. It examines the contradictions between these activities and the declaration of 
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the Human Right to Water by the United Nations General Assembly in 2010, and 
discusses the possibilities of local communities in maintaining control over water sources 
in their confrontations with powerful corporate actors and their allies.  
Finally, Article 3 by David Hall looks at the controversial topic of corruption in 
public services, which is normally presented in the mainstream literature as a public-
sector problem, which often demonizes public sector institutions as part of the strategies 
taken by these actors to promote privatization of essential services and other activities. 
The author examines a wide range of corruption cases and dismounts the arguments that 
cast corruption as being an inherently public-sector problem and promote privatization 
as a strategy to introduce “transparency” and “accountability”. The article demonstrates 
the existence of large-scale private corruption resulting from privatization processes, 
often shielded from public scrutiny by the authorities that should protect the interest of 
users and citizens. The author examines the pros and cons of different institutional 
approaches that have been introduced to tackle corruption in public services, and 
proposes several strategies to democratize this aspect of public service administration.  
 The materials presented in the three articles have significant relevance, in the face 
of the new agressive wave of privatization policies that is being implemented worldwide. 
The articles present evidence-based discussions of the topics, contributing to rebalance a 
debate that is systematically biased in favour of the orthodox neoliberal policies promoted 
by international organizations and national governments. Given the relevance of these 
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Financing water and sanitation: public realities 
 
David Hall,1 and Emanuele Lobina, Public Services International Research Unit 
(PSIRU) University of Greenwich 
 
 
An earlier version of this paper was published by PSIRU as a report for the 6th World 






The orthodox model for financing water and sanitation treats the state in developing 
countries as being unable to finance investment. It promotes instead the primacy of 
commercial direct financing, with cost recovery from consumers supported by targeted 
aid. It also emphasises ‘improved’ connections, rather than household connections. The 
paper argues that all these positions conflict with empirical evidence. 
  This does not reflect the historical experience of high income countries. The great 
majority of investment in water and sanitation services in Europe, North America and 
Japan, has been carried out by the public sector using public finance raised through 
taxation. Even in France the extension of the system was carried out by and through 
municipalities, not through private operators. Central governments have also played a 
key role in financing investment in water systems, and in managing water resources and 
floods. 
 The advantages of public finance are that the state pays lower interest than the 
private sector, it avoids that poorer ‘consumers’ cannot afford to pay full costs, and the 
major benefits of universal water and sanitation connections are public health, not private 
gains.  
 The orthodox approach has failed to generate significant amounts of private 
investment in developing countries. In Africa, the most important source of finance is the 
public sector in middle income countries, and donor aid in low income countries: the 
private sector contribution is close to zero. In India, the private sector contribution is also 
close to zero, with national, state and local governments financing nearly all the 
investment.  
 The economic crisis has not affected the prospects for public finance, because of 
continued economic growth in developing countries, and in increased aid from southern 
countries. The negative impact on private companies is not significant because of its tiny 
role. 
                                                 
1 E-mail: halldj@gmail.com. 
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 The costs of providing full water and sewerage household connections are not 
unaffordable. The benefits in terms of lives saved are very high, and there is a clear 
positive economic gain even for poorest countries. For the great majority of countries, 
meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by such household connections 
could be achieved by a 10-year investment programme costing less than 1% of GDP per 
year, and would deliver significant socio-economic benefits.  
 Countries are in fact acting in accordance with this reality, and investing close to 
the amounts necessary for such targets. In the last 20 years, two-thirds of the advances in 
water systems in developing countries consist of household connections, rather than 
‘improved sources’. More than 1.2 billion people have received household water 
connections in that time, the equivalent of the combined populations of all OECD 
countries - Europe, North America, Japan and Korea together. And overall, the 
investment by countries has more than achieved the MDGs for water. 
 The framework used by donors and international institutions is now sharply 
different from the reality of water and sanitation services in developing countries.  The 
two models – the World Bank/donor model, and the national model - have conflicting 
positions on four key aspects – source of finance, type of operator, ‘improved’ source or 
household connection, and leading role of donors or countries. The national model is in 







For the last 20 years, the orthodox paradigm for financing water and sanitation in 
developing countries has treated the state as having inadequate capacity to either finance 
or operate water and sanitation services. It has instead promoted the primacy of private 
direct financing of investment, and the market model, with pricing mechanisms providing 
incentives and signals for investments, supported by targeted aid designed to ‘leverage’ 
the maximum amount of commercial investment.  In recent years, it has become apparent 
that these approaches have not succeeded in generating a flow of investment adequate to 
meet developmental needs. 
 This paper examines whether this paradigm is both empirically and conceptually 
flawed. It presents empirical evidence on the historical relative use of public and private 
finance for investment in water and sanitation systems in developed countries, evidence 
on the relative use of public and private finance and aid in developing countries, and 
evidence on the likely impact of the economic crisis. It presents an analysis of the 
affordability of investment in water and sanitation systems for developing countries, and 
specifically investment in household connections.  
 In conclusion, it discusses the gap between the official paradigm and observed 
reality of water and sanitation systems, and identifies two models – the World 
Bank/donor model, and the national model - with conflicting positions on four key 
aspects – source of finance, type of operator, ‘improved’ source or household connection, 
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and leading role of donors or countries. The national model is in reality driving 
developments in the sector, and also reflects a new southern view on development.  
 
 
Water finance in high income countries 
 
The great majority of investment in water and sanitation services in high income countries 
has been carried out by the public sector using public finance raised through taxation, or 
loans raised on the security of this flow of taxation.  
 During the 19th century, water utilities were created or taken over by 
municipalities in nearly all European countries, including the UK. This was linked to the 
growth of municipal socialism (or ‘gas and water socialism’), which drove the 
development of local public services in Europe.  This ideology saw the public sector as a 
mechanism to fulfil a set of economic and political objectives - economic development, 
public health and improvement of social conditions for the urban poor. The municipalities 
developed financial mechanisms superior to the private sector, including borrowing long-
term money from local savers, at low interest rates because of the security of their flow 
of income from taxes (Juuti and Katko, 2005; Barraque, 2007). 
 If anything, the process of municipalisation was even more rapid in the USA than 
in Europe: by 1897, 82% of the largest cities were served by municipal operations. 
Municipalisation was seen as a way to overcome the systemic inefficiencies of the private 
contractors: “During the 19th century, the previously private systems came under public 
ownership and public provision because of the inefficiency, costs and corruption 
connected to them….Democratically elected city councils bought existing utilities and 
transport systems and set up new ones of their own. This resulted in more effective 
control, higher employment, and greater benefits to the local people. Councils also gained 
the right to borrow money to invest in the development of their own systems” (Foss-
Mollan, 2001;  Melosi, 2000).   
 In some countries, water charges continue to be collected through property taxes 
rather than metered payments - in the UK the majority of households continue to pay 
annual charges based on the value of their property, rather than metered consumption of 
water. Water services in the UK were provided by municipalities until 1974 and then by 
state-owned regional authorities until 1989.  Virtually 100% connection of urban 
population had been achieved well before that date: the privatised water companies of 
England have, historically, contributed little to the extension of urban water supply 
systems in England or Wales (still less in Scotland and Northern Ireland, where the 
systems remain public). 
  In France, almost uniquely, the private companies have survived from the 19th 
century and evolved in the process. During the 19th century when the dominant system 
was private concessions, there was very little growth in connections to the network.  The 
municipalities found it was not legally possible to force concession companies to extend 
the network as public policy required, and therefore introduced municipal companies 
(“régies”) as the vehicle for investment and operation. Virtually all the growth in 
extension of the network took place under this form during the first 70 years of the 20th 
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century.  This included major extensions in rural areas following the Second World War, 
paid for by the urban population, a massive cross-subsidy only possible as an act of public 
policy.  From the 1970s, delegation to the private sector grew again to become the 
dominant mode, but this time typically under “affermage” lease contracts, under which 
responsibility for investments remained with the municipalities.  Thus even in France the 
extension of the system was carried out by and through municipalities, not through 
private operators. 
 Despite the dominant role of municipalities, central governments have played a 
significant role in financing water systems. This has sometimes involved paying directly 
for the water supply service, so that there is virtually no role for charges (Ireland); 
distributing some part of central tax revenue to support local authority spending on water 
and other services (Canada); providing cheap loan finance for local authorities to use for 
capital investment (USA); or collecting part of water charges centrally and redistributing 
it to authorities which need to invest (France). In Europe, the EU itself plays a major role 
in public financing of water systems in poorer states through the cohesion and solidarity 
funds, and through low interest loans from its public sector development instrument, the 
European Investment Bank. 
 In many cases, user charges still include what are effectively ear-marked or 
hypothecated taxes rather than charges related to consumption, even under largely 
privatised systems. The charges levied by the private water companies in England and 
Wales are still based on a single annual payment based on the value of the property (as 
specified in a tax base which is now obsolete for local government purposes).  In 
Hungary, despite privatisation of water in most major cities, tax revenues of central 
government continue to be the main source for financing investment in infrastructure. In 
France, “funding for water services is still overwhelmingly public, and private funding 
accounts for only 12% of the investment” (Pezon, 2009 p.198) . While it remains possible 
for people to hypothesise or imagine that such private water companies might be vehicles 
for investment to extend water systems, there is no historical record of this happening – 
not even in France or the UK. 
 
 
Table No 1. Finance for drinking water and sewerage services in France 2006 
 € millions Percentage  
Private agents 576 12 
Local authorities – service budget 2370 49.4 
Local authorities – general budget 141 2.9 
Water agencies 1161 24.0 
Départements 367 7.6 
State 121 2.5 
Regions 64 1.3 
TOTAL all sources 4800 100 
Source: Pezon (2009). 
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 In Europe, the use of taxation to finance water infrastructure is now 
institutionalised at European level through the EU cohesion funds. The EU collects about 
€20 in taxes from every person in the EU each year to support investment in water and 
sanitation through these funds, and they remain an important source of finance for 
investments in central and eastern Europe, as they were in southern Europe during the 
1980s and 1990s, where the impact was substantial: in Portugal, for example, the 
population connected to piped water supply rose from 61% in 1989 to 95% in 1999 (Hall 
and Lobina, 2008a).  
 Public finance played the same central role in developing water and sanitation 
systems in Japan, and in North America. Investment in large-scale capture and storage of 
water, and flood management, is also carried out overwhelmingly by public investment. 
Japan’s flood management programme continues to attract €9 billion investment from 
public funds each year. These infrastructure projects have also been key elements in 
nation-building and economic development: “The United States has invested trillions of 
dollars in hydraulic infrastructure. While these investments have been recognized as 
crucial to promoting growth, many of the largest federal investments in US history were 
made to curb the destructive effects of water, particularly in response to devastating 
floods.  The nation’s founders saw investments in water development as a way to bring 
the nation together”.  Indeed, the USA uses part of its military, the US Army Corps of 
Engineers, to carry out and manage much of this investment (Grey and Sadoff, 2007).  
 The history of water and sanitation in Toronto, Canada, illustrates a typical 
developmental path. In the early 1870s the growing city suffered from cholera and 
typhoid due to inadequate sanitation, and the  city council, despite an economic recession, 
not only municipalised the water service, it installed  new sewers and made sewerage 
connections compulsory, for public health reasons, whether householders asked for it or 
not, financed by the municipality.  The benefits were immense: “This unprecedented 
power…led to tremendous sewer development in the 1880’s…..The effects of the typhoid 
fever epidemic were greatly reduced by the presence of a complete, clean sewage system. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, most of the streets in the city had been serviced and 
the operational costs were met through direct taxation” (Pharasi and Kennedy, 2002). The 
same approach was then taken up across the province of Ontario, where public water 
systems grew rapidly by the turn of the century. The Public Health Act 1912 enshrined 
the Toronto principles of public finance and compulsory connection, by giving the 
provincial board of health the right not only to decide when a water or sewerage system 
was necessary “in the interest of the public health”, but also to require local councils to 
finance it (Benidickson, 2001). The water and sanitation system of Toronto has continued 
to be publicly run and financed. As a proportion of the household incomes of Toronto, 
there is a long-term downward trend, after the peaks in expenditure which were 
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General economic advantage of public finance 
 
There are clear economic reasons why public spending has been the preferred method of 
financing water infrastructure, which are demonstrated in Massarutto’s analysis of the 
Italian water sector (Massarutto, et. al., 2008).   
 Firstly, the state can finance construction directly from tax revenues, in which 
case the cost of capital is zero; if it chooses to borrow, as a way of shifting some costs 
onto future taxpayers, it can do so more cheaply than the private sector, because of the 
superior security of tax revenues.  Private investors not only have to pay higher interest 
rates, but also face the risk of being unable to secure long-term returns on sunk 
investments.  
 Capital costs represent 75% or more of total costs, and so the lower cost of public 
finance is decisive. The difference in the capital cost between public and private is as 
large as the total operational cost, in Massarutto’s study of Italy.  It is therefore impossible 
for the private sector to offset higher capital costs by comparative savings in operational 
efficiency (and the cumulative evidence of numerous studies is that the private sector 
does not, in any case, have any systematic advantage in terms of operating efficiency).2 
 Massarutto’s paper also shows a second reason why public finance is needed. 
Household payments for a service based on full cost recovery by private investors, would 
represent 3.8-5.0% of income for low income households, even in relatively rich regions 
of a high income country such as Italy.  A true consumer market would result in far less 
than 100% coverage, and commercial operators would not offer to provide service to 
customers whose ability to pay a high fixed cost is unreliable.  
 A third reason is pointed out by Günther and Fink (2010): the health benefits of 
water and sewerage connections are social rather than private, and so the willingness of 
individual consumers to spend on these services will be below the socially optimal level. 
For the social benefit to be realised, connection must be compulsory, not optional – as 
illustrated by the case of Toronto (above). 
 
 
Financing water and sanitation services in developing countries 
 
Since 1990, the central model promoted by the World Bank and other international 
agencies has been of the private water company investing, developing and operating 
water and sanitation services in middle and low income countries.  It is now generally 
agreed that this experiment has failed to generate significant amounts of private 
investment, and that there has been almost universal public resistance to private 
companies.  A World Bank research paper in 2006, reviewing actual private investment 
in infrastructure in developing countries between 1983 and 2004, concluded: 
 
PPI [private participation in infrastructure] has disappointed - playing a far less 
significant role in financing infrastructure in cities than was hoped for, and which 
                                                 
2 There is a large literature on this subject, covering other infrastructure sectors as well as water. 
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might be expected given the attention it has received and continues to receive in 
strategies to mobilize financing for infrastructure (Clarke Annez, 2006; Marin, 
2009; Hall et. al., 2005; Gassner et. al., 2009). 
 
 
Financing water and sanitation infrastructure in Africa 
 
The World Bank-AFD 2010 report on ‘Africa’s Infrastructure’ provides data on the 
relative contribution of different sources of finance to the provision of water and 
sanitation services. These sources are: public sector, aid from OECD countries (ODA), 
aid from non-OECD countries (such as China), and the private sector (PPI, or private 
participation in infrastructure). Data is based on averages for the years 2001-2006 (World 
Bank-AFD, 2010).  
 All operational expenditure is financed through the public sector. For capital 
expenditure alone, aid is more important than public spending. Aid from OECD 
countries, at about $1.23 billion per year, is about 15% greater than the public sector 
finance. Aid from non-OECD countries, such as China, is much smaller. The overall 
totals show that about 80% of all finance (excluding household spending, see below) 
comes through the public sector.  
 In low income countries, the contribution of aid to capital investment is about 
three times as great as the public sector. The public sector is more important in middle 
income countries, and most of all in resource rich countries, where its contribution is 
three times greater than aid. In all countries, the contribution of non-OECD aid is smaller 
than either OECD aid or the public sector, though it is many times larger than the 
contribution of the private sector.  It is relatively largest in resource rich countries, 
reflecting the preference of southern donors for focussing aid on these countries. In all 
groups of countries, and in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the private sector 
contribution is close to zero.    
 The table includes an additional figure of $2.13 billion per year of ‘household 
self-finance’.  This represents a very rough estimate of spending by private households 
on sanitation, derived from household survey data. It is very doubtful whether private 
spending on household toilets should be classified as infrastructure spending, and 
household spending is a different category from corporate investment. It is probable that 
the figure is included in order to boost the apparent contribution of the ‘private’ sector, 
and it is certainly highly misleading to combine it with the PPI data, as one of the figures 
in the report does.3 
 
 
                                                 
3 See World Bank/AFD, 2010: 329: “No reliable data exist on sanitation expenditures because individual 
households undertake so much of the expense. However, recent investment can be estimated from 
household surveys”.  These estimates of household spending are shown separately in table 16.6. However, 
in table 0.4 of the report, this estimate is combined with the $0.01billion attributable to PPI, under the 
generic heading ‘private’. In figure 2.1, this combined figure is presented in bar-charts as attributable to 
‘private participation in infrastructure’, which is an error. 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers                                                                                                             
Thematic Area Series SATCUASPE – TA3 - Urban Water Cycle and 
Essential Public Services – Vol. 3, No 5 
 
Castro, José Esteban (Ed.)  
  
 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 






Table No 2.  Financial flows to water and sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa 
USD $billions per year 
Country 




















Africa 3.06 1.06 1.23 0.16 0.01 2.13 4.58 7.64 
Low-income 
fragile 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.32 0.45 
Low-income non-
fragile 0.30 0.25 0.78 0.05 0.00 0.45 1.54 1.83 
Middle income 2.17 0.15 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.47 2.64 
Resource rich 0.15 0.72 0.24 0.08 0.01 0.52 1.57 1.72 
Source: World Bank-AFD, 2010, Table 16.6 
 
 
 The report also covers other sectors, including energy, transport and 
communications. Three general findings were that finance is predominantly African, not 
external; public, not private (except in telecoms); and through central government, not 
local.  
 Overall, it noted that in general “spending on infrastructure in Africa is higher 
than previously thought, amounting to $45 billion per year”. Most of it is paid for by 
Africans: “two-thirds of this overall spending is domestically sourced: $30 billion of 
annual spending is financed by the African taxpayer and infrastructure user, and a further 
$15 billion is from external sources”.  Thus external aid and FDI supplement, rather than 
dominate investment.  It also notes that “The public sector remains the dominant source 
of finance for water, energy, and transport in all but the fragile states”. The private sector 
makes no significant contribution to infrastructure investment in Africa except in 
telecoms (World Bank-AFD, 2010: 8).   
 It further notes that “Public investment is largely tax financed and executed 
through central government budgets, whereas the operating and maintenance expenditure 
is largely financed from user charges and executed through state owned enterprises.”  
(World Bank/AFD 2010 p.8) Thus the key channels of public finance are through central 
government and the public sector – in contrast to the model at the centre of the 
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Source: World Bank/AFD, 2010. 
 
 
Investment in Asia 
 
There is no comparable recent international study on financing of infrastructure in South 
Asia. Another World Bank study in 2006 estimated that investments in infrastructure in 
South Asia were about 12% financed by the private sector and 88% by the public sector. 
This was estimated by valuing changes in infrastructure stocks, and netting out the 
portion that was financed by the private sector, giving estimates of around US$24.4 
billion per year in public investment and US$3.2 billion in private investment (Chatterton 
and Puerto, 2006). But data from India shows that this estimate certainly overstates the 
role of the private sector. 
 There is a wealth of information on the financing of infrastructure investment in 
India, in the reports of the Indian Planning Commission. This provides a breakdown by 
sector – electricity, roads, telecoms etc. – and by the source of financing, under three 
headings: central government, state government and private sector.  The private sector is 
the greatest source of investment finance in telecoms (82%), and also a large proportion 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers                                                                                                             
Thematic Area Series SATCUASPE – TA3 - Urban Water Cycle and 
Essential Public Services – Vol. 3, No 5 
 
Castro, José Esteban (Ed.)  
  
 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 






of investment in electricity (44%), but in roads and rail its contribution is very small (16% 
and 4% respectively).  In water supply and sanitation, there has been investment of over 
USD $22 billion in the 5-year period 2007-2012- however, the contribution of the private 
sector is only 0.4%. 
 
 
Table No 3. Financing of water and sanitation investment, India, 2007-2012 
Currency converted at R50=$1 
 R crore 
US$ 
million 




 Water Supply & Sanitation   111689 22338 100 0.41% 
Of which:     
 Central government 43235 8647 38.7  
 State governments   67971 13594 60.9  
 Private sector  484   97 0.4  
Source: Government of India, 2007: 55-56. 
 
 
Difference from usual estimates 
 
This distribution differs from that generally used in global discussions of water finance. 
These typically assume a much larger role for the private sector – local and international: 
for example, a recent article estimated that globally, local and international private 
companies were delivering 25% of investment in water and sanitation in developing 
countries in 2005 (Jimenez and Perez-Foguet, 2009). But it is consistent with the history 
of investment in water.  
 Before the promotion of the private sector began in the 1990s, public sector 
investment in developing countries used to be at a much higher level. During the 1990s 
this dropped sharply: in Latin America, public sector investment in infrastructure dropped 
from 3% of GDP to 0.8%. A World Bank study concluded that the promotion of 
privatisation was itself a causal factor: “Ultimately, many of the adjustments in public 
financing and ODA largely reflect the fact that the expectations of private sector 
participation in the financing of infrastructure needs were overoptimistic.” Moreover, 
private sector investments were heavily skewed away from the areas of greatest need – 
Africa and South Asia – and in sectors other than water:  the bulk of private investment 
went to energy and telecoms in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe (Briceño-
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The effects of the crisis 
 
Economic crisis, fiscal stimulus, economic growth and aid 
 
The crisis has done much less damage to African economies than it has to northern 
countries. The region as a whole did not even experience a contraction in 2009, when 
GDP growth overall was 2%; the IMF forecasts that in 2010 there will be growth of 4.7%, 
and in 2011 growth of 6% in GDP. 
 This is partly due to the use of fiscal stimulus packages, which included increased 
plans for public infrastructure spending, and have been strongly praised by the IFIs: 
“stimulus packages have been managed successfully without major impact on debt, and 
have increased the scale of public investment in infrastructure and the credibility of public 
spending on infrastructure” (IMF, 2010). There is no pressure from the World Bank or 
the IMF to make cuts to reduce these deficits, unlike the situation in Europe. The World 
Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 2010 says: “The need to unwind stimulus measures 
among developing countries is generally less pressing; because both fiscal deficits and 
debt-to-GDP ratios are much lower” (World Bank, 2010: 5-6).  
 This is despite the fact that the stimulus packages were large: public spending 
plans were increased by 5% of GDP above the average level of the 2003-2007 period, 
with higher levels of spending on health and education in low income countries, even in 
2009 (IMF, 2010a).     
 African governments are also confidently planning to finance their deficits by 
borrowing, including issuing bonds. Both Kenya and Tanzania plan to issue €500 million 
in bonds, Uganda plans a similar issue aimed at national rather than international 
investors. This policy is supported by a longer-term trend since 2000 for developing 
country governments being able to borrow money more cheaply, compared with rich 
countries. According to an IMF study, the spreads and effective interest rates paid by 
these governments has fallen in the last decade, so the cost of borrowing is lower (IMF, 
2010:b).  
 Public spending as a percentage of GDP has increased across Africa as a whole, 
and remains above pre-crisis levels. The IMF forecasts GDP growth of 6% in 2012, so 
the actual volume of public spending will be significantly higher – about 10% higher in 
2011 than in 2008, in real terms (IMF, 2011).  
 
 
Table No 4. Public spending as % of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa 2006-2012 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Africa 24.8 26.6 27.8 29.8 30.3 29.2 28.4 
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Aid trends: OECD and non-OECD 
 
The trend in aid spending by OECD donors depends on the outcome of policy decisions 
on public spending cuts as part of the austerity policies being adopted.  In the water sector, 
OECD figures show a rise in commitments of ODA for water in 2009, but a sharp drop 
in 2010, to levels below those of 2008. Given the political pressure for austerity policies, 
and the fact that developing countries are growing much faster than OECD countries, it 
is certain that aid from OECD countries will decline as a proportion of GDP of recipient 
countries.  
 
Table No 5. Aid by OECD donor countries – water, 2005-2010 (US$ millions) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
ODA 
commitments 
4567.41 3958.85 4412.24 5817.91 6513.57 5249.65 
Source : OECD, 2010b.4 
 
 
Non-OECD aid is concentrated on countries with natural resources. Thus the main 
beneficiaries of Chinese infrastructure finance to the sub-region are Nigeria (34 per cent), 
Angola (20 per cent), Ethiopia (10 per cent) and Sudan (8 per cent). China’s aid is 
focussed on infrastructure, although water is a relatively small element: “about 54 per 
cent of China’s support to Africa over the period 2002–2007 was in infrastructure and 
public works. It is estimated that Chinese infrastructure finance commitments rose from 
$470 million in 2001 to $4.5 billion in 2007.  With regard to sectoral distribution, 33 per 
cent of Chinese infrastructure finance to sub-Saharan Africa over the period 2001– 2007 
went to electricity, 33 per cent to transport, 17 per cent to ICT, 14 per cent to general 
projects and 2 per cent to water” (Lum et al., 2009, cited in UNCTAD, 2010). Thus 
China’s aid to water in Africa is around $90 million per annum. This confirms the 
findings of the Africa infrastructure review: Chinese aid to water in Africa is eight 
times greater than the contribution of the world’s private sector. 
 An UNCTAD report does not expect the crisis to necessarily have a negative 
effect on aid from non-OECD countries: “For example, since the onset of the crisis, China 
has stepped up rather than reduced its economic engagement in African countries. In 
particular, it has promised to increase support to Africa. Brazil, India and the Republic of 
Korea have also signalled their intention to provide more support to the region in the 
coming years. Although the financial and economic crisis poses challenges for Africa– 
South cooperation, it also presents opportunities for Africa and could have a positive 
effect on Southern support to the region through two channels. First, to the extent that it 
has reduced growth prospects, it may create an incentive for Southern partners to pay 
more attention to the effectiveness of their support and so maximize its development 
                                                 
4 Query generated at 
http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/#?x=1&y=6&f=3:40,4:1,5:4,2:1,7:1&q=3:51,40+4:1+5:4+2:1+7:1+1:2+6:200
5,2006,2007,2008,2009,2010. 
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impact in the region. Second, the crisis could also increase Southern solidarity and the 
need to enhance economic and development cooperation as a mechanism for weathering 
the impact of the global slowdown in developing countries” (UNCTAD, 2010).  
 
Chart B. Non-OECD aid to Africa, 2006 










Source: UNCTAD, 2010, Table 6. 
 
 
Costs and affordability 
 
Costs and benefits 
 
The starting point for any question of affordability is costs. The table below shows the 
most recent comprehensive costings published by the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
for developing countries. The table shows that the cost of full household connections is 
roughly double the cost of basic ‘improved’ connections.  Using the costs for full 
household connections, the table shows that all developing countries could achieve MDG 
levels of coverage using full household connections for both water and sewerage for a 
cost of $35 billion per year over 10 years. 
 
Table No 6. Costs of meeting MDGs plus urban sewerage connections 
Urban and rural. US$ billion, 2005 prices 
 





over 10 years  




WHO base case: low-cost improvements   
Costs of new coverage inc O&M 184 18 
Extra cost of household connections: $bn. 143 15 
Total costs of new coverage inc O&M 327 33 
Extra cost of PSIRU urban sewerage target 22 2 
Total costs of coverage inc O&M  349 35 
Source: WHO 2008, PSIRU calculations. 
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The relative health benefits of household connections has been confirmed by a 
number of studies.  A study of the installation of household sewerage connections in the 
city of Salvador, Brazil found a 20% fall in child morbidity.5 Studies by Günther and 
Fink found that household water connections reduced episodes of diarrhoea twice as 
much as a shared pipe, and household toilets by three times as much as shared public 
facilities.  This translates into big differences in mortality rates: household water 
connections and flush toilets lead to an average mortality reduction of 25 deaths per 1000 
live births, whereas ‘improved’ water and sanitation technology (such as public water 
pumps and ventilated improved pit latrines) only lowers child mortality by 8 deaths per 
1000.  The effect of household connections is also longer lasting, because the technology 
is more durable.  This impact of full household connections would by itself achieve 41% 
of the improvement in child mortality needed to meet the MDG for child mortality rates 
(Günther and Fink, 2010, 2011).   
 Purely in economic terms, these benefits are larger than the costs of the 
investments. Günther and Fink calculate each year of life saved by water and sewerage 
connections costs less than the economic output per person per year for the great majority 
of developing countries (as measured by GDP per capita). They also found that full 
household connections are more cost-effective than just ‘improved’ sanitation because of 
the long-lasting nature of the infrastructure and its effects (Günther and Fink, 2011). In 
this sense, countries cannot afford not to make these investments - a country which does 
not do so would be worse off overall. The WSP now estimates that in India the health 
and economic damage of inadequate sanitation is equivalent to 6.4% of GDP, six times 
the estimated cost of dealing with it. The WSP adds that making this investment: “will 




                                                 
5 For this and other references see Hall and Lobina 2008b: 11. 
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Table No 7. Cost per life-years saved as % of GDP per capita, selected African countries 
(full household connections water and sewerage.) 
 
Country Cost per life year 
saved as % of 
GDP per capita 
 
Country Cost per life year 
saved as % of 
GDP per capita 
 
Benin   0.722  Malawi 0.827  
Burkina Faso   0.380  Mali   0.528 
Cameroon 0.273  Mozambique 0.359 
Chad  0.205  Namibia 0.310 
Congo, Rep.   0.299  Niger 0.675 
Gabon 0.150  Nigeria   0.228 
Ghana 0.843  Senegal 0.283 
Guinea 0.205  Swaziland 0.116  
Kenya 0.605  Tanzania 1.125  
Lesotho 0.644  Uganda 0.753  
Liberia 2.898  Zambia 0.283  
Madagascar   2.164  Zimbabwe 0.855 
 
Average = 0.655 
 
Source: Günther and Fink, 2011, Table 10. 
 
 
Most of these benefits come in the form of externalities, however, and realised 
over a longer time period, so that they are not enjoyed by the investor, but by society and 
the economy in general. A 2009 private sector report on global water economics by 
McKinsey analyses investment requirements in the water sector, and identifies 
agricultural schemes and industrial efficiency schemes as areas where there may be 
sufficient short-term returns for private investment. Water supply to households is in a 
different category:  
  
[…] in many cases the measures with long payback periods—many of them 
supply infrastructure—are also the most capital intensive ones. This likely 
indicates that those measures will not attract private sector capital, requiring the 
financial burden to fall fully on the public sector (McKinsey & Co., 2009: 98).  
 
Some commercial investment and activities may also have detrimental effects on 
overall welfare. For example, manufacturers of commercial drinks may invest in 
promotions which effectively encourage the purchase of sweetened drinks rather than 
plain water and thus have a damaging effect on public health. Coca-Cola has been 
reprimanded for this in the UK, where it showed a television advertisement with the 
slogan ‘for people who don’t like water’. The advertising standards authority upheld 
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complaints: “the overriding theme of the ad was the characters rejection of water… we 
concluded that the ad was irresponsible and could discourage good dietary practice” 
(ASA, 2008). Commercial bottled water is an economically inefficient and 
environmentally harmful way of distributing water. The inefficient form of transport 
makes it far more expensive per litre to consumers, as well as generating plastic waste 
and consuming large amounts of energy in its production. In a number of cities, including 
Paris, public authorities are actively trying to discourage the use of bottled water, even to 
the point of experimenting with providing sparkling water through public drinking 




Affordable economic resources 
 
The next level of affordability is to assess what the implications are in terms of the 
resources available in the whole economy, usually measured by GDP. This is a constraint, 
which at the extreme means that programmes of investment whose annual costs exceed 
100% of GDP cannot be carried out, whatever the cost-benefit ratios.  The real constraints 
are far below this point, but for poor countries the constraints are worse, because a given 
investment programme represents a larger share of GDP. So the next step is to calculate 
what the costs are as a proportion of GDP. It does not matter, for these purposes, whether 
the necessary investment is financed by consumer spending, government spending or 
corporate spending (or even aid) – all of this is part of GDP.  This issue is important, 
because the majority of official and donor publications on water assert or assume that the 
level of investment – especially in household water and sewerage connections – is 
unaffordable. The UN’s World Water Development Report (WWDR) is typical. It argues 
that the option of full household connections to sewers and water supply cannot and will 
not be financed, because the cost of achieving these gains is “above income levels in 
developing countries” (UN, 2006: 419).  
 The tables below shows two recent sets of estimates for the costs of water and 
sanitation investments. The first was part of an OECD project estimating investment 
needs in infrastructure sectors, based on collecting a range of country level estimates of 
actual investments (Cashman and Ashley, 2008). The second was a PSIRU report on 
sewerage, examining the costs, benefits and affordability of household connections to 
sewerage systems (Hall and Lobina, 2008b). The OECD was mainly concerned with the 
“enormous implications in terms of the ability of service providers for their business 
models and in raising the necessary finances”, while the PSIRU paper was focussed on 
the macro-economic feasibility of financing household connections over a 10 year 
programme for all developing countries, based on household connections required, WHO 
cost estimates, and actual GDP.   
 Both studies arrived at similar estimates of the proportion of GDP required. They 
are very close for low income countries, where the OECD range is between 0.71% and 
6.30% of GDP, and the PSIRU estimates range from 0.64% to 6.29%. For middle income 
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countries the PSIRU range is lower: 0.11% to 0.89%, compared with the OECD range of 
0.54% to 2.60% (Table 8).  
 The PSIRU estimates provide specific figures at country level, covering the great 
majority of developing countries. The second table shows the estimated costs for full 
household connections in countries containing nearly 90% of the population identified 
by the MDGs, if developed rapidly in a 10-year programme.  The costs are less than 1% 
of GDP per annum for 13 of these countries; and less than 0.5% in 8 of these (Table 9). 
In only two countries – DR Congo and Ethiopia – do the costs exceed 1.5% of GDP.  
 
 
Table No 8. Required levels of spending on water infrastructure, % of GDP 
 OECD range PSIRU range 
   
Low income countries  0.71% - 6.30% 0.64% - 6.29% 
Middle income countries 0.54% - 2.60% 0.11% - 0.89% 
High income countries 0.35% - 1.20% - 




Table No 9. Costs of meeting MDGs in 10 years with household water and sanitation 
connections 
2006 GDP and prices; annual cost = total cost/10, assuming 10 year programme, 
no borrowing. 






Annual cost as 
%GDP 
China ML 7878 0.30 
India L 5764 0.64 
Indonesia ML 2291 0.73 
Brazil ML 1881 0.21 
Nigeria L 1364 1.48 
Philippines ML 1069 0.89 
Pakistan L 1000 0.82 
Bangladesh L 855 1.22 
Iran ML 790 0.38 
Congo DR L 485 6.29 
   as % of global GDP 
All developing 
countries  34900 0.08% 
Source: Hall and Lobina, 2008b. 
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The affordability of this can be assessed using various criteria. Judged in the 
context of economic growth, it is a relatively small proportion of annual expected growth 
rates, and so does not even require cutbacks in existing consumer or public spending. As 
noted above, sub-Saharan African countries are expected to grow at a rate of 4% per 
annum or more, even after the economic crisis; Latin American countries at a similar rate; 
and Asian countries at around 7% per annum. China, India and Brazil are already 
achieving growth rates of nearly 10% in 2010. The cost of completing household 
connections for water and sewerage in 10 years can thus be met by using less than a 
quarter of annual growth, in nearly all countries. This still leaves ample room for 
investment in other infrastructure such as electricity, as well as continued growth of 
consumer spending.  
 Judged against the history of national investment in infrastructure, it is not an 
unreasonable level. The average level of public investment in developing countries as a 
whole on all infrastructure has varied between 7% and 10% of Gross National Income 
(GNI) over the last 35 years, and is generally considered to be too low. Spending less 
than 1% on new investment in water and sanitation is not therefore an excessive burden 
(Roy, et. al., 2006).    
 For India, the data from the Indian Planning Commission shows that over the 
period 2007-2012, actual investment in water and sanitation infrastructure has averaged 
0.41% of GDP. Investment in all infrastructure in India has averaged 7.5% of GDP during 
that period, with the public sector financing nearly two-thirds of that, nearly 5% of GDP 
(Government of India, 2007: 6-7). There is evidence from national budgets that China 
and Brazil are already making the necessary levels of investment (Hall and Lobina, 
2008b). In terms of actual practice, it is clear from the latest JMP report that many 
countries are in fact already investing the necessary amount to achieve full household 
connections (see next section).  As the review of investment sources makes clear, this 
investment is being funded from public finance, not private capital.  
 The requisite levels are thus not only affordable, they are affordable for the great 
majority of countries out of national economic resources alone, without need for 
government borrowing, and even if there were no assistance from donors at all.   
 There remains a clear role for aid in those few countries where the costs exceed 
1% of GDP per annum. The table shows what would be needed if aid is focussed so that 
it covers costs in countries where the investment needed exceeds 1% of GDP, then the 
annual total aid required would be around $2.2 billion per annum. This is less than half 
current aid on water and sanitation, and the equivalent of only about $6.50 per person per 
annum in high income countries (Table 9) (Hall and Lobina, 2008b). 
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Table No 10. Level of aid needed for household water and sewerage connections to cover 
countries with annual costs of over 1% of GDP 
Country 
Annual cost as 
%GDP 
Aid needed to cover 
spending >1% of 
GDP ($m.) 
   
Nigeria 1.48 440 
Bangladesh 1.22 156 
Congo DR 6.29 408 
Sudan 1.18 53 
Ethiopia 2.37 177 
Other developing countries  >1.0 1002 
   
TOTAL for all developing 
countries  2236 
Source: Hall and Lobina, 2008b. 
 
 
Connections, not improvements 
 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) set targets for water and sanitation in 
developing countries, to be achieved by 2015. Remarkably, the MDG for drinking water 
has already been achieved, 5 years ahead of target. By 2010, only 11% of the world’s 
population were using ‘unimproved’ water sources, compared with the MDG target of 
less than 12%.  
 Although the MDGs were expressed only in terms of ‘improved’ sources, it is 
also clear that developing countries themselves are mainly seeking and achieving 
household connections. In the last 20 years, two-thirds of the advances in water systems 
in developing countries consisted of new household connections, rather than ‘improved 
sources’. Between 1990 and 2010, a period of 20 years, more than 1.26 billion people 
worldwide gained access to a piped connection on the premises, equivalent to the 
combined populations of all OECD countries, including all of Europe, North America, 
Japan and Korea. This is an astonishing achievement in such a short period. Developing 
countries have also provided ‘improved’ sanitation for an extra 1.6 billion people, 
covering 56% of the population in all. This falls short of the MDG target of 75%, and 
there is no data on household sewerage connections as opposed to “improved” (JMP, 
2012).6 
 
                                                 
6 This result means that people have gained access to some kind of improved water source at an annual rate 
of nearly 100 million per year. This compares with the slightly higher annual rate of 110 million per year 
in the international decade of water in the 1980s, which involved only the public sector and governments, 
and was generally derided as a failure by the World Bank and others (according to Cashman and Ashley, 
2008). 
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 % Millions % Millions % Millions 
1990  32   1,324 70 2,896  36   1,489 
2010  46   2,589 86 4,840  56   3,152 
Change 
(nos)  1,265  1,944  1,662 
Change %  96  67  112 
Source: JMP, 2012. 
 
 
There are regional differences. In Eastern Asia (overwhelmingly China), Latin 
America, West Asia and North Africa progress was exclusively the result of increases in 
piped water connections on premises, while the number of people with an ‘improved’ 
source actually declined by 93 million (Chart D).  In these regions, the percentage of the 
entire population with piped household water connections is already close to the level of 
92% in high income countries.  The corresponding connection rate is 70% in China and 
83-86% in Latin America, West Asia and North Africa.  The level of piped household 
water connections in Latin America, at 86%, is virtually identical to that of Canada, at 
87%: Brazil (92%), and Chile (93%) are doing better than Canada. 
 There is also a predictable difference between urban and rural areas. Overall, 73% 
of the urban population of developing countries now gets piped water from a household 
connection, compared with 24% of rural inhabitants. In this too there is a regional 
disparity: in Sub-Saharan Africa, 34% of urban population have piped connections, 
compared with only 5% of the rural population (JMP, 2010, 2012).    
 Various factors may explain the regional differences, most obviously the lower 
level of GDP per capita in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. This suggests that 
affordability at the national level is a constraint. It also suggests that the activities of 
donors and development banks have, at the very least, failed to improve the position of 
poorer countries in these regions, and that this may be due to the  inappropriateness of 
the financing model they have advocated over the previous 20 years. 
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Chart C. Population gaining piped household connections or ‘improved’ sources 1990-
2008 
 




Discussion and conclusions 
 
 
Divergence from reality 
 
The preceding sections have set out recent evidence on the sources of finance for 
investment, the implications of the crisis for future finance, the affordability of MDG 
targets and household connections, and the actual trends in access and household 
connections.  This evidence shows a different picture from that presented by reports from 
the major international institutions. Investment is taking place – but financed by national 
public finance, not private investors, nor mainly by aid. The impact of and response to 
the crisis is likely to reinforce this pattern, with national tax revenues able to grow along 
with southern economies, while northern aid and corporate investment is threatened. The 
cost of MDG targets is affordable for the great majority of developing countries, as long 
as this is done through taxation not user charges.  The MDGs are in fact being met, at 
least in water, and mainly through household connections, not ‘improved’ sources. 
 This reality contrasts sharply with the view presented by the great majority of 
official international donor publications. For example, the 2010 OECD paper on 
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‘innovative financing mechanisms’ asserts that: ‘the water and sanitation sector is 
seriously under-financed in many countries, leading to the deterioration and potential 
collapse of the infrastructure’ (OECD, 2010c). But as the latest JMP report makes clear, 
the MDGs for water will be met, and with a much higher level of household connections 
than envisaged by the MDGs themselves.  The infrastructure, far from collapsing, is being 
extended faster and on a larger scale than envisaged by international recommendations.   
 The OECD paper follows this wildly incorrect statement with the advice that ‘in 
the long-run, structural reforms are needed to improve the sector’s revenue generation 
potential so as to fill the financing gap. In the short to medium term, access to repayable 
finance (such as loans, bonds and equity) will be critical so as to bridge the financing 
gap… innovation is required so as to increase the attractiveness of the sector to providers 
of repayable finance, particularly those bringing private sector funds’ (OECD, 2010c). 
But there is not a great financing gap: infrastructure is being built – by national 
governments, using public finance. Growth rates mean that adequate economic resources 
will be available to build more, using public finance, and there is a definable ‘gap’ in the 
poorest countries which could be filled by aid – but not, certainly, by private capital in 
search of an attractive return.  History confirms that very little investment in water and 
sanitation has ever been financed this way.  The OECD advice is therefore dangerously 
misleading.  The OECD paper goes on to admit that ‘public financing has come back to 
the fore as a significant source of investment’, but even then offers the policy advice that 
‘it will be important to evaluate how public financing can be used in an optimal manner 
so as to leverage repayable finance from the market’ (OECD, 2010c).    
 The calculations set out above on affordability challenge the common donor view 
that developing countries are economically unable to develop the service themselves 
without aid and FDI from the north. For example, the World Water Development Report 
2006 claimed that “In  many nations, at least in the next five to ten years, it  will not be 
possible for the provision deficiencies in most urban areas to be addressed by the 
conventional model of a (public or private) water utility extending piped water supplies 
and sewers to individual households” (UN, 2006: 419).  This has turned out to be wrong: 
the JMP evidence shows not only the scale and pace of new investments, but also that 
household connections are central. The WWDR also made the Malthusian claim that: 
“population growth and burgeoning water demand have convinced most policymakers 
that the cost of water system development will increasingly have to be met by users” 
(UN, 2006: 419), but these policy-makers were wrong: even in Africa, nearly all the 
investment in the water sector is being financed from taxation, either national or 
indirectly via aid. Even in Kampala, Uganda, where the water service is run as a 
commercial venture and is held up as a model, the company relies on government finance 
from tax revenues for any new investment.7   
 The framework used by donors and international institutions is now sharply 
different from the reality of water and sanitation services in developing countries.  The 
key features of this divergence are set out diagrammatically in chart D.  While the 
development of water and sanitation services is actually based on public finance, the 
                                                 
7 William Murhaiwe, CEO of NWSC Uganda, speaking at the World Water Forum Istanbul, March 2009. 
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World Bank/donor model continues to focus repeatedly on private investment and a role 
for private finance. The overwhelming majority of operators are public sector, while the 
donors focus on operating and pricing techniques for private, or commercialised, 
companies. Household connections to piped water and sewerage are considered too 
expensive, while developing countries use them as the main way forward. Finally, the 
World Bank/donor model sees policy as led by international donors, whilst in practice 
many national governments are developing their own policies as independent countries – 
reflecting the reality that they are also providing the great majority of the finance, as well 
as a more fundamentally democratic approach. 
 
 
Chart D. Two models: donor/private/improved vs. National/public/household 
connections 




 NATIONAL MODEL 
 
     
Finance  Private + aid  Public + aid 
     
Operation  Private  Public 
     
Access type  Improved  Household connection 
     
Leading role  Donors, banks, 
companies 
 National governments 
     
Location focus  Rural   Urban 
 
 
A national framework 
 
This national framework corresponds with a new – or revived – view of the role of the 
state in development. It is already very clear in Latin American countries, India, China 
and other Asian countries, where the role of the state in investing in infrastructure is 
explicitly recognised as a central element in development and economic growth. It is now 
also being articulated in Africa, by leading politicians and officials, in terms which 
include an explicit rejection of the role of donors and the role of the market, in favour of 
a restored strong role for the state. Two examples of this are worth quoting.  
 President Museveni of Uganda articulated an emphasis on national decisions, 
public finance, and relegation of the role of donors, in a speech to the meeting of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 2010: 
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Our countries will not have the necessary money without adequate tax 
collections… One cause of failure to develop infrastructure in Uganda was 
depending on foreign borrowing or grants.  The foreign lending Agencies either 
do not know or do not care to find out the magnitude of needs Africa has.  ….  
During the time I have been in Government, I have discovered that depending on 
external funding for infrastructure development (grants and loans) is very 
dangerous.  ….  The money begged for or borrowed from outside is too little, very 
unreliable and too slow in coming to be able to help us in dealing with 
infrastructure.8 
 
Louis Kasekende, Chief Economist of the African Development Bank Group, 
made a deeper presentation of the issues at a conference in August 2009: 
 
…the crisis should be grasped as a turning point in the development path of 
developing countries, particularly here in Africa. In order to overcome the 
continent’s structural constraints and reduce its external dependence, it is 
necessary to reconsider the role of the state. The market only works through 
incremental changes and small steps. However, developing countries need to 
stimulate investments by socializing risk, in order to achieve long-term structural 
transformation…. macroeconomic policies across the developing world during 
the last several decades have been strongly influenced by the recommendations 
of the international finance institutions and bilateral aid donors who, in turn, were 
heavily influenced by the neoclassical school......  As argued by several scholars, 
the reforms based on this approach have largely failed to develop the private 
sector as the driving force for development. I thus want to table for your 
consideration the need for a marked change in the approach to macroeconomic 
policies across the developing world and for one that recognizes that government 
has a vital role to play in restructuring the economy and in creating the conditions 
for a ‘take-off’ into sustained growth......  Since economic development is about 
societal transformation, and not simply a technical economic problem to be left 
to economists, then governments must also act to ensure that the costs and benefits 
of adjustment are distributed in an equitable and socially acceptable manner.9 
 
  
                                                 
8 Speech By H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni President of the Republic of Uganda At the Opening of  The 
African Union Summit  Theme:  Maternal, Infant and Child Health and  Development in Africa 25th July 
2010 Commonwealth Resort, Munyonyo, Kampala   
http://www.mediacentre.go.ug/details.php?catId=6&item=946.  
9 Extracts from “Public Policy and Economic Development in Africa” Speech by Mr Louis Kasekende, 
Chief Economist, African Development Bank Group, 65th Congress of the International Institute of Public 
Finance August 13, 2009, Cape Town, South Africa www.iipf.org/speeches/Kasekende_2009.pdf. 
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Finally, some policy conclusions may be drawn for both developing countries and donors. 
Developing countries should continue to plan for development of household water and 
sewerage connections. The important financial issue is to ensure that sufficient taxes are 
raised to finance the programme. Attempts to finance it through user charges recovering 
costs, or attempts to involve the private sector in investment, are likely to be expensive 
irrelevances that will slow down achievements. Countries such as Indonesia and 
Philippines need to develop major public infrastructure spending programmes. 
 Donors should stop encouraging countries to try to finance development of 
sewerage systems through cost recovery from users, and stop encouraging countries to 
believe that the private sector will make any significant contribution to investment in 
sanitation. They should instead help countries to build the taxation capacity needed to 
finance this investment, and focus aid on the countries in greatest need of assistance, in 
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Annexe: Costs as percentage of GDP: details of OECD and PSIRU estimates 
 
Table No 12. Cost of water and sanitation investment as % of GDP, OECD 
 
 
Source: Cashman and Ashley, 2008. 
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Table No 13.  Cost of household connections as % of GDP 
Country Income 
group 













Afghanistan L 1.82 Malaysia MU 0.21 
Angola ML 0.66 Mali L 1.44 
Argentina MU 0.2 Morocco ML 0.25 
Bangladesh L 1.22 Mozambique L 2.34 
Benin L 1.68 Myanmar L  
Bolivia ML 0.9 Nepal L 1.3 
Brazil ML 0.21 Nicaragua L 0.95 
Burkina Faso L 1.05 Niger L 1.39 
Cambodia L 0.94 Nigeria L 1.48 
Chad L 1.36 Pakistan L 0.82 
China ML 0.3 Paraguay ML 0.77 
Congo L 1.17 Peru ML 0.19 
Congo DR L 6.29 Philippines ML 0.89 
Côte d'Ivoire L 1.1 Rwanda L 1.7 
Cuba L  Senegal L 1.02 
Ecuador ML 0.27 South Africa MU 0.11 
Egypt ML 0.33 Sri Lanka ML 0.18 
Ethiopia L 2.37 Sudan L 1.18 
Ghana L 1.91 Tanzania L 1.61 
Guinea L 1.85 Thailand ML 0.2 
Haiti L 2.3 Togo L 2.68 
India L 0.64 Uganda L 1 
Indonesia ML 0.73 Venezuela MU 0.19 
Iran ML 0.38 Viet Nam L 0.77 
Kenya L 0.74 Yemen L 0.91 
Korea DPR L  Zambia L 0.88 
Korea Rep H 0.03  
L=lower, MU=upper middle, ML=lower 
middle 
Madagascar L 2.26 
Malawi L 2.73 
Source: Hall and Lobina 2008b. 
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Companies use a lot of water and their waste is a pollution risk.  This brings them into 
conflict with many communities around the world, when companies capture scarce water 
resources or cause environmental damage. These conflicts are real – by contrast with the 
false myths that ‘the world is running out of water’, or that there are many wars between 
countries over water resources. 
 The companies concerned in conflicts over water resources are not, in general, 
the companies involved in privatised water supply and sanitation services. They are rather 
the companies which are the main consumers of water – agribusiness, drinks and food 
companies, and mining companies. 
The water demands of agribusiness conflict with other users of water, including 
local farmers. The large-scale purchasing of land concessions in Africa and elsewhere are 
the biggest current examples of this. Water is a key factor in these deals. Most of the land 
grabs are driven by growers of ‘biofuel’ crops, so that virtual water is exported from 
Africa into petrol tanks. 
 Mining and oil production uses large amounts of water, and pollutes water 
resources, as a result of adding chemicals and as a result of waste products from the 
mining process itself. In South America mining operations are in frequent conflict with 
local communities. For example, in Chile, a mining company has bought water rights in 
the Atacama Desert; in Ecuador, Chevron Oil has been fined $18billion for contaminating 
water resources.  
 The largest corporate users of water are companies selling soft drinks or beer, 
including Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Nestle and Unilever. There have been a number of 
conflicts in India between local communities and drinks companies abstracting water. 
Three examples involve bottling plants of Coca-Cola, which led to deterioration in 
                                                 
10 E-mail: halldj@gmail.com. 
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groundwater levels, so that local people, in particular farmers, were left with less water 
for their own needs. 
 At global level the same companies that are major consumers of water promote a 
number of initiatives to try and advance ideas which favour their interests in these 
conflicts with other users.  
 These companies use the idea of water efficiency and reducing their global water 
footprint to claim that this is offsetting local impacts. But these measures do nothing to 
reduce the actual impact in these specific locations, and have to be understood as public 
relations exercises.  
 The Water Resources Group, launched at the World Economic Forum, promotes 
the idea that general water efficiency is the key issue, that ‘clearer’ water rights are 
important, and that companies should be involved in defining ‘institutional mechanisms’ 
to allocate water resources.  
 The CEO Water Mandate strongly promotes the idea of ‘shared risk’. This claims 
that governments and society equally share the risks identified by companies of 
‘regulatory’ and ‘reputational’ risks. But for the rest of society, regulation is a benefit, 
and the activity of companies creates risks.  
 By contrast, in response to many years of campaigns, in 2010 the UN General 
Assembly agreed that there is a human right to water and sanitation. This has been widely 
welcomed and used by social organisations at national and local level, but is regarded 
with anxious hostility by companies. 
 In conclusion, there is a contrast between the success of companies in promoting 
their ideas at global level, and the greater impact of the concept of water as a human right 





Companies use a lot of water and their waste is a pollution risk. This brings them into 
conflict with many communities around the world, when companies capture scarce water 
resources or cause environmental damage. Corporate groups promote ideas such as 
shared risks, global water footprints, and water markets, which minimise the role of 
democratic politics. This contrasts sharply with the decision by the United Nations that 
access to water is a human right, and that human uses have priority. Companies are 
strongly averse to recognising rights which could limit their own economic interests. 
These conflicting ideologies reflect the material conflict over water resources, and 
different approaches to political processes.  
 
This report consists of four sections: 
 Contextual information about water resources, and real and imaginary conflicts 
 A review of actual conflicts over water resources between local communities and 
companies 
 Global corporate initiatives on water resources, and the UN decision 
 Discussion and conclusion 
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Imaginary and real conflicts over water 
 
There is a myth in some circles that the world is running out of freshwater. The world is 
not running out of water. There is a constant amount of water in the world, but the 
availability of freshwater for human uses depends on local conditions. These may be 
affected by general factors e.g. climate change but the actual supply of available water 
depends on local weather patterns, rivers and aquifers, and the actual demands for water 
within the same locality, whether for household, farming or industrial use.  In addition, 
the environmental impact of human use depends on the treatment of used water and other 
waste, and the sustainability of withdrawals from specific aquifers or rivers.  
 There is a second myth, that there are serious problems resolving ‘trans-boundary’ 
water conflicts between different countries. Many people have quoted the phrase ‘the 
wars of the 21st century will be fought over water, not oil’.  But in practice there have 
been very few conflicts over trans-boundary water issues (with the exception of 
Israel/Palestine, where the source of the conflict is not the water issue itself). Agreements 
have been and are being negotiated over both transboundary river use and, now, 
transboundary aquifers. So: “Although transboundary water resources can be fodder for 
hostility, the record of cooperation is vastly superior to that of acute conflict, that is to 
say, water is much more a vector of cooperation than a source of conflict” (The 
Economist, 2010; Wolf et. al., 2003). 
 
 
Chart A. Transboundary water: cooperation not conflict 
 
Source: Wolf, et. al., 2003. 
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However, there are many other conflicts over other water issues, arising from 
economic and political factors within in specific countries or areas. These are not trans-
boundary issues, but conflicts between different users of water - households, farmers, and 
business - and conflicts over the relative priority of commercial and public interests in 
specific cities, countryside, water basins. These conflicts and power struggles can be 
observed over a long time and many places, especially in context of water scarcity - the 
development of water supply for the city of Los Angeles in the early 20th century, for 
example, involved complex battles, negotiations and trade-offs between farmers, 
business interests and political actors.  
 The present conflicts range across all continents.  Global corporate initiatives to 
promote specific approaches to water resources, such as the Water Resources Group 
created by the World Economic Forum, have arisen principally because companies find 
themselves in conflict with other users and subject to political demands. They reflect the 
greater power and status of corporate bodies, especially their ability to organise at global 
level.  Their main function is to assert a corporate view of water resource issues, so that 
local conflicts are more likely to be resolved in favour of corporate interest. The 
initiatives are a form of ‘ideological hegemony’.  
 
 
Business impact on water resources 
 
Commercial uses of water resources may conflict with these needs of other users and the 
environment (a) at times and places where water resources are scarce, so all user needs 
cannot be satisfied while sustaining the water sources (b) because untreated used water 
and other production processes pollute the environment, including water sources.  
 For individual companies, and for capital as a whole, the importance of each local 
issue is entirely economic. Water is only one factor in corporate decisions. The 
availability of labour, transport costs, location of mines, and cost of land are other factors 
which are usually of greater economic importance. The outcome of water conflicts affects 
the profitability of commercial activities directly - for example if abstractions by 
companies are limited to an amount less than the most profitable – or indirectly, for 
example if a company is forced to relocate a bottling plant to a location which entails 
higher transport costs. Thus Coca-Cola warns its shareholders that increasing demand for 
water means that the company “may incur increasing production costs or face capacity 
constraints which could adversely affect our profitability or net operating revenues in the 
long run” (Coca Cola, 2008).  The treatment of used water may also affect the profitability 
of commercial activities, to the extent that companies pay for it, either by treating it 
themselves or by paying taxes for the cost of treatment.   
The companies concerned in conflicts over water resources are not, in general, 
the companies involved in privatised water supply and sanitation services. They are rather 
the companies which are the main consumers of water – agribusiness, drinks and food 
companies, and mining companies. This section reviews the conflicts between businesses 
operating in these sectors and local populations, in all three sectors and in different 
continents. The cases also show how markets in water rights are useful in resolving 
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Agribusiness: land and water grabs in Africa 
 
Globally, agriculture is the greatest user of water resources, for irrigating fields: in the 
global south over 80% of water is used by agriculture. Much of this consists of small-
scale farming for subsistence and supplying local markets, but a growing proportion is in 
the hands of companies and investors. The water demands of this agribusiness can 
conflict with other users of water, including local farmers. The large-scale purchasing of 
land concessions in Africa and elsewhere are the biggest current examples of this. 
 
 
Land and water grabs in Africa and elsewhere11 
 
According to recent estimates by Oxfam, 227 million hectares of land in developing 
countries have been sold or leased since 2001, half of it in Africa, and most of it to 
international investors. The deals typically involve 50-99 year leases or concessions of 
land areas over 10,000 hectares (Oxfam, 2011; Bush et. al., 2011). Most of the 
investment, nearly 60%, is for biofuels; about 20% for food production; and another 20% 
is for mining, tourism, industry and forestry (International Land Coalition, 2011; 
Patterson, 2009; Smaller and Mann, 2009).     
 They include government purchases e.g. by Egypt and Saudi Arabia in Sudan, 
which actually advertises overseas the opportunities for such investment. But many 
investments are made by international agribusiness companies; some investments are by 
private equity firms such as the Egyptian firm Citadel Capital, the UK firm Sun Biofuels, 
and the German firm Acazis; some are by businesses in richer African countries, for 
example, South African farmers buying 172,000 acres of land in the Congo for export 
crops; and many are made by local elites (International Land Coalition, 2011).  
 The World Bank argues that the land leases are a market mechanism of 
modernisation and development bringing land into higher value use, transferring 
ownership from less to more efficient producers, and enabling more food to be produced 
for growing populations. Critics point out that the Bank itself and the IMF forced many 
African countries to discontinue public investment in irrigation as part of structural 
adjustment programmes, and argue that the Bank understates the contribution of 
traditional farming practices. Little of the benefit is going to the countries themselves: 
governments are being persuaded to exempt investors from tax, and charge small lease 
fees, so that little public benefit is gained for the exploitation of local public natural 
resources. Secret negotiation of commercial deals “reduces scope for public scrutiny and 
                                                 
11 This section draws on a number of key reports: World Bank, 2010; Cotula and Vermeulen, 2009; Cotula, 
2011; IIED, 2011; Smaller and Mann, 2009; Woodhouse and Ganho, 2011; Oxfam, 2011; Farm Land Grab 
(2012); International Land Coalition 2011. 
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creates a breeding ground for corruption” (Woodhouse and Ganho, 2011; Bush et. al., 
2011; International Land Coalition, 2011).  
 
 
Table No 1. Investing in ‘land grabs’: states and companies, food and fuel 
Investor 
type 
Examples Locations Objectives Final market 












All regions biofuel, food, feed Global 
markets 
Source: based on Smaller and Mann, 2009. 
 
 
Water is a key factor in these deals. The grabs involve not just the land but also 
the water resources and the cheap local labour, to support the typical large-scale mono-
crop plantations: “the notion of existing, available marginal lands is fundamentally 
flawed; investors are looking not only for available lands, but also lands that have sources 
of water” (Borras, et. al., 2011).   
 This access is included in the lease contract by formalised water rights to ensure 
the profitability of the investment. These guarantees effectively give the investor priority 
over other users, and customary users rarely have any formal rights. In some cases, no 
charge is made: in Senegal the contract specifies that the water is free; or water supply is 
effectively subsidised by providing access to water from dams constructed using public 
finance, for example in Ethiopia and Guinea. If governments try to revise the water rights 
after the contracts is signed, they may be liable for compensation under a bilateral 
investment or trade treaty.   
 A report on Mali found that two contracts guarantee investors more than half of 
the dry season critical reserve of water and exclusivity of service in emergency situation, 
while other contracts take water rights for granted; the only payments for water were a 
charge per hectare of land, unrelated to volume; the contracts themselves place limits on 
government  ability to act, especially in response to continuous water shortages; most 
deals provide access to land without any lease fees being paid; and local residents were 
left out of the negotiating process with their customary rights ignored (IIED, 2011; 
Cotula, 2011; Baumgart, 2011).   
 In the case of Procana in Mozambique the company got a 50-year lease on 30,000 
ha, on which it planned to grow sugar cane using drip irrigation.  Procana obtained a 
government guarantee for up 750m3 per year “To ensure that cane production is not 
compromised by other potential users”.   Part of this would draw on the water in the 
Massingir dam, whose prime use is for electricity generation for export and for local 
business and households – the reallocation of water transfers the risk in the opposite 
direction, so the government may lose export earnings, or local users may have a less 
reliable supply of electricity. The water for irrigation also comes from local rivers, which 
creates a risk of water shortages for downstream small farmers.  Procana saw potential 
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conflict over the use of the dam as a major risk factor in their investment (Borras, et. al., 
2011; see also Woodhouse and Ganho, 2011). In 2010 the deal with Procana was 
cancelled because the company could not raise the money to deliver the $475m. 
investment plan: the government was reportedly looking for a new investor (Nhantumbo 
and Salomão, 2010; Borras, et. al., 2011; Woodhouse and Ganho, 2011; Agencia de 
Informação de Moçambique, 2008).    
 The process also illustrates the relative disadvantage of local communities in 
asserting their rights to water against the claims of international companies: “African 
governments are signing away water rights for decades with insufficient regard for how 
this will affect millions of local users, including fishing, farming and pastoralist 
communities” (IIED 2011; Hall, 2011; Smaller and Mann, 2009).    
 Some campaigns against these deals have been successful. In Tanzania, a land 
deal for growing biofuels was cancelled as a result of protests (Hall, 2011).  In 
Madagascar, public protest forced the government to cancel a proposal to lease half the 
arable land in Madagascar to a South Korean multinational, Daewoo Logistics, and 
forced the government to resign as well. The campaign also forced the cancellation of a 
deal to physically export 1% of the Faraony river’s flow to Saudi Arabia - about 





The increasing use of land for biofuels has already been a factor in surging world food 
prices, and is placing extra demands on water resources. The growth of biofuel production 
in the USA is expected to account for 12% of the total growth in demand for water in the 
USA in the next 20 years, requiring more than twice as much extra water as municipal 
water supply. In the eastern USA water resources are effectively free, while growers in 
the western USA have to buy water rights, but even there the cost of the water resources 
amounts to less than 1 cent per gallon of ethanol produced from biofuels. The existence 
of water rights markets does not, therefore, provide a deterrent to such use of water, but 
rather an opportunity for the growers of such a profitable crop to outbid others with less 
profitable uses (Tidwell, et. al., 2011; Gerbens-Leenes and Hoekstra, 2011). Biofuels are 
not a good ‘green’ fuel, either, when compared with other technical alternatives. A car 
using ethanol, the main biofuel product, uses between 4 and 10 times as much water per 





The impact on water resources of the land grabs shows the limitations of the concept of 
‘virtual water’. This concept identifies a real effect of trade in products requiring high 
water input, especially food, This can in principle compensate for a relative lack of water 
in the importing country, so that for example an oil-producing country which is mostly 
desert can import food produced with water in other countries.  But virtual water does 
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not ‘trickle down’ from water rich countries to water poor countries, because 
economically poor countries with low water resources cannot afford to import water this 
way.  In fact, trade in agricultural products containing ‘virtual water’ is rather dominated 
by a few rich countries: 4% of countries account for 80% of virtual water transfers, and 
the number of people experiencing water shortages has increased in recent years despite 
a massive increase in trade in agricultural products.  So virtual water transfers are not an 
“economically invisible and politically silent remedy for water deficits” between 
countries, but rather a feature of commercial activity which may conflict with other needs 
for water resources within countries.  Since virtual water is also embedded in biofuel 
crops, it is also a way of exporting water from Africa or Latin America into the fuel tanks 
of cars in high income countries (Suweis et. al., 2011; Seekell et. al., 2010; Allan, 2002). 
 
 
Mining and oil in South America 
 
Mining and oil production affects water resources in two ways.  Firstly, large amounts of 
water are needed for many mining operations, from drilling to washing the minerals, as 
well as water for the household needs of the workers.  In water scarce regions where the 
mines are the greatest consumers of water, mining companies themselves may develop 
or buy the main water supply systems: “When infrastructure and management systems 
provided by the company are also involved in supplying local communities and rural 
industries, the multiple stakeholders and different values involved introduce a complexity 
that reflects overlapping and sometimes conflicting priorities associated with the concept 
of sustainable development” (Robin et. al., 2003).   
 Secondly, mining processes pollute water, both as a result of adding chemicals – 
such as cyanide in gold mining or arsenic in uranium mining - and as a result of waste 
products from the mining process itself, which may also obstruct and block rivers and 
streams. Even modern mines in the USA pollute neighbouring streams with cyanide, 
selenium, copper arsenic and thallium (Earthworks, 2008).  
 The process of ‘fracking’ to extract oil and gas from shale or sands is an example 
of both types of impact. It involves the use of water, mixed with chemicals and sand, 
injected under pressure to release the oil or gas. An average ‘well’ uses about 10,000 m3 
of water in this process. Some is lost underground, and may contaminate groundwater; 
the wastewater returned to the surface may include tonnes of chemicals, and may 
contaminate land and surface water (Andrews et. al., 2009).  
 As a result of higher global prices for commodities, including oil, there is now 
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Chile and water rights 
 
Two disputes in Chile are good illustrations of the conflicts. They also show how markets 
in water rights make the problems worse, not better, and how the privatisation of public 
water supplies makes it easier for companies to buy water resources.   
 Calama – said to be among the driest cities in the world – is in the northern region 
of Chile, which includes the Atacama Desert and also the main mining activities of the 
country. The inhabitants of Calama are protesting at the decision by the water company 
for the region, Aguas Antofagasta, to sell 550 litres per second of raw water from the Rio 
Loa, the only river in the region, to a mine owned by multinationals Xstrata and Anglo-
American.  The protests are based on the impact on the environment and the extra stress 
placed on water resources for the city. Desalination plants have been constructed to 
increase the available water for other mining operations, but it is cheaper for the 
Xstrata/Anglo-American mine to divert water from the river. Mining interests also 
control the public water supply: the water company is itself privately owned by 
Antofagasta plc, a British mining company, now majority owned by the wealthy Chilean 
Luksic family. In addition to the water company, Antofagasta plc also owns the regional 
railway system, Ferrocarril de Antofagasta (El Ciudadano, 2012b; Codelco es Noticia, 
2012). 
 In the capital Santiago, there is a similar dispute. The water company, Aguas 
Andinas – which is also privatised -  has agreed to sell 2.5m3 of water per second from 
the Laguna Negra y Embalse del Yeso, built as a reservoir to supply drinking water for 
the city, to the energy multi-national AES, for a 530MW hydro-electric project, Alto 
Maipo. The opposition is based on protests about the environmental impact, the effect on 
the water supply for Santiago, and the effects on other businesses such as tourism. The 
Chilean parliament has asked the water regulator SISS to investigate the legality of the 
contract, although the government argues that there should be no interference with 
“acuerdos entre privados” [private contracts].  The opposition argues that this is contrary 
to the “the new declaration by the UN Assembly of the human right to water” (El 
Ciudadano, 2012b; Business News Americas, 2012; Global Power Report, 2011).    
 The water rights regime is thus part of the problem: the current legal systems, 
notably the law on water rights, are failing to protect environmental and human interests.  
It continues to be politically and ideologically contested: “competition between private 
and public interests have often produced unfortunate consequences because of the lack 
of power of the state to allocate water and to protect the public welfare... ideological 
conflict continues to characterize much of the discussion of water policy”. When 
President Bachelet introduced a constitutional reform bill to recognize water scarcity as 
a threat to national security, and enable the government to restrict private water rights, 
interest groups of large landowners such as the National Society of Agriculture 
denounced the bill as leading to expropriation of water without compensation (Tafur, 
2011; Borzutzky and Madden, 2011).  
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Ecuador, Peru and Argentina 
 
The Supreme Court in Ecuador has recently confirmed an award of USD $18 billion in 
damages against the oil company Chevron for contamination of water in the Amazon 
basin as a result of oil drilling activities in the 1990s by a joint venture including Texaco, 
now owned by Chevron.  The oil drilling spilled more than 30bn gallons of toxic wastes 
and crude oil into Ecuador's Amazon basin.  The company denies liability in the case, 
which has continued for 18 years already. 
 As well as the scale of the damage, the case illustrates how corporations are 
prepared to deny the legitimacy of the rights of others and of the processes by which they 
are enforced. The company responded to the latest court ruling by stating: “Chevron does 
not believe that the Ecuador ruling is enforceable in any court that observes the rule of 
law. The company will continue to seek to hold accountable the perpetrators of this 
fraud”. This was criticised by the court for ‘manifest bad faith’ and ‘abusive’ conduct, 
and by the lawyer for the indigenous communities as racist: “Chevron does not want to 
ever recognise that indigenous or poor people have the right to access justice” (ENS, 
2012; The Guardian, 2011, 2012).    
 In Peru there are over 148 conflicts between indigenous rural communities and 
mining companies over the use of water and the pollution caused by the mining 
companies. This is contrasted with a lack of priority given to human needs: in the Puno 
region, only 25% have access to drinking water, but 80% of the water resources are said 
to be polluted. Campaigners are calling for a constitutional amendment which 
“recognises drinking water and sanitation as a human right whose provision should not 
be subject to business interests” (El Ciudadano, 2012c).   
 There are many similar disputes in Argentina between communities and mining 
companies, as well as opposition to paper mills for the same reason. Many of these 
disputes have continued for a decade or more (El Ciudadano, 2012a).  
 
 
Drinks companies: impacts in south Asia and North America 
 
The largest corporate users of water are companies selling soft drinks or beer, 90% or 
more of which are water with some other ingredients such as sugar, flavouring and 
alcohol. The largest corporate water consumers in the world include the drinks (and food) 
companies Coca-Cola, Pepsico, Nestle and Unilever, and the beer companies. 
 
Table No 2. Food and drinks companies with largest water consumption 2006 
Company Water Used  
(bn litres) 
Ratio, litres of water per kg 
or litre of end product 
Coca-Cola  288  2.4  
Nestlé  155  4.1  
Unilever  66  3.3  
Total  613   
Source: JP Morgan (2008). 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers                                                                                                             
Thematic Area Series SATCUASPE – TA3 - Urban Water Cycle and 
Essential Public Services – Vol. 3, No 5 
 
Castro, José Esteban (Ed.)  
  
 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 






The drinks companies also sell bottled water, which packages water from springs. 
Bottled water is far more costly than piped water, because transporting water in bottles is 
very inefficient compared with a piped water network, using 2,000 times as much energy 
as tap water. It is also subject to less stringent safety and quality checks than piped water, 
and generates large volumes of waste in the form of plastic bottles.  Conflicts have 
occurred in North America over the impact of drinks companies on local water tables.  
The Perrier bottled water company (part of Nestle) was forced to close 4 of its wells in 
Michigan as a result of local opposition, despite hiring local public relations consultants.  
One reaction by the companies has been to bottle water from public supplies: as much as 
40% of all bottled water sold in the USA is taken from a municipal water supply, and 
Coca-Cola used water from the public supply for its Dasani brand in the UK (BBC, 2004; 
The Environmental Magazine, 2003; Responsible Research, 2010; IGEL, 2011). 
 
 
Coca-Cola and other drinks companies in India 
 
There have been a number of conflicts in India between local communities and drinks 
companies abstracting water. Three examples involve bottling plants of Coca-Cola, 
which led to deterioration in groundwater levels, so that local people, in particular 
farmers, were left with less water for their own needs (Responsible Research, 2010; India 
Resource Center, 2011a).   
 
Table No 3. Groundwater impact of three Coca-Cola bottling plants in India 
Location Change in groundwater levels  
 10 years prior to Coca-Cola 
bottling operations 
10 years since  Coca-Cola bottling 
operations 
Mehdigani +7.95 metres -7.9 metres 
Kala Dera -3.94metres -25.35metres 
Source: India Resource Centre (2011, a,b). 
 
 
Coca-Cola opened a bottling plant at Palakkad, Kerala, in 1999. There were 
complaints and protests from the local community that the plant was using excessive 
amounts of groundwater, causing depletion and contamination in local wells. These 
protests were taken up by the panchayat. The panchayats – local councils – which are a 
distinctive feature of government in India, are responsible for regulating the use of local 
resources, including water. In many parts of India panchayats are weak bodies, but in 
Kerala there has been a deliberate political effort by the State to decentralise money and 
power to these bodies, providing the elected representatives with both training and 
professional volunteers to support their work, as well as a system of participatory 
planning and budgeting. In the case of the Palakkad bottling plant, the Perumatty 
Panchayat which covered the area, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Kerala 
High Court, which ruled in the panchayat’s favour. As a result, Kerala’s Minister for 
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Water ordered the closure of the plant in 2004. It has not been allowed to re-open, as long 
as the panchayat continues to withhold permission.   
 The production of drinks also produces waste sludge which pollutes the 
environment unless properly treated. In Palakkad, Coca-Cola tried to dispose of waste by 
offering it as a ‘free fertiliser’ to local farmers. It was found to be useless as a fertiliser, 
and contaminated with toxic chemicals including lead and cadmium. The company only 
stopped distributing its waste when ordered to do so by the state government.  The state 
of Kerala also appointed a High Power Committee of experts to investigate civil and 
criminal claims against Coca-Cola, which concluded that the company had depleted 
water resources, caused environmental damage, and could be held responsible for causing 
economic losses to local residents totalling Indian Rupees 216 crore (US$ 48 million), 
that a special claims tribunal should be set up to facilitate such claims, and that Coca-
Cola had breached a number of laws. The state government then passed a law to create 
the tribunal (Drew, 2008; Government of Kerala, 2009; India Resource Center, 2010; 
Responsible Research, 2010; BB, 2003).   
 Coca-Cola opened another bottling plant in Kala Dera, Rajasthan, in 2000, 
although the area’s groundwater reserves had already been declared to be ‘over-
exploited’ in 1998. A report by the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) in 2008 noted 
that “The company's assessment of water availability in the vicinity of a bottling 
operation should be from a perspective that is wider than business continuity [...]. Siting 
policies need to recognize and respect the existing (formal and informal) riparian rights. 
For instance, the informal rights of the farmers to extract groundwater for irrigation need 
to be respected’" It specifically condemned the opening of the plant at Kala Dera, and 
recommended closure as “the plant's operations in this area would continue to be one of 
the contributors to a worsening water situation and a source of stress to the communities 
around”  The report also noted that: “the state governments in India have not been able 
to value their water resources appropriately. The water use charges levied by various state 
governments render this important input into the production process virtually free”. 
Groundwater levels fell a further 3.6 metres between 2009 and 2010 (TERI, 2008).  
 A third plant in Mehdiganj, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, opened in 1999. The 
economic benefits of employment opportunities were not as great as hoped: many jobs 
went to workers from other areas, wages were low, and the company resisted attempts to 
organise its workers in unions. There were problems with wastewater: a spill in 2002 
contaminated agricultural land. But the greatest problem was the depletion of 
groundwater by the new plant: the levels fell by 7.9 meters in 11 years, whereas 
previously they had been rising. A local political institution, the Lok Sabiti (‘people’s 
committee’) organised protest, using the slogan “coca cola pani chor” (“Coca-Cola steals 
water”). The company has not negotiated with the local organisation, but rather treated it 
as a security problem, with police called in to arrest protestors (Drew, 2008). 
 The above cases all involve Coca-Cola, but other companies have similar impacts. 
For example, nine out of 34 PepsiCo bottling plants in India were operating in areas 
officially designated as water-stressed (‘over-exploited’, ‘critical’ or ‘semi-critical’) 
(BBC, 2011; SABMiller, 2012; PepiCo India, 2010; India Resource Center, 2011c; Ercin 
et. al., 2011).   
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Economic efficiency, water neutrality 
 
Companies argue that these impacts are compensated for by other actions, by which they 
can become ‘water neutral’ or even ‘positive’.  Coca-Cola claims to aim at ‘global water 
neutrality’; PepsiCo argues that overall it has a positive water balance in India: 
“essentially this means that we were able to give back to society much more water than 
we used to manufacture our products by recharging and replenishing water through 
various sustainable initiatives”. These corporate actions fall into three categories – 
reducing the water footprint of their own products; supporting the water efficiency of 
other users; and promoting recharge schemes and rainwater harvesting. Only the third of 
these, however, mitigates the local impact of their water abstractions.  
 Coca-Cola has analysed its global water footprint, which consists of multiple local 
demands to produce all the ingredients in the drink. This full supply chain footprint, 
including for example the water used to grow sugar and other ingredients, is between 300 
and 600 litres for every litre of drink produced. Nearly all of this is consumed through 
growing and manufacturing the various ingredients, especially sugar and vanilla. 
Similarly, studies by SAB Miller show that the total supply chain footprint of beer is 
between 45 litres and 155 litres per litre of beer. But global reductions in the water 
footprint of the product, for example by reducing the water use of vanilla growers in 
Madagascar, does nothing at all to offset the local impact of a bottling plant in India 
(Responsible Research, 2010; Ercin, et. al., 2011).    
 PepsiCo finances agricultural efficiency schemes and community schemes, such 
as rainwater harvesting, which between them save 10 billion litres of water, which the 
company compares with 5.8 billion litres used to produce Pepsi products in India, and 
argues that it is therefore ‘water positive’ in India.  Coca-Cola has funded drip irrigation 
systems for 15 farmers in India. SAB Miller has financed small-scale demonstration 
fields for local farmers on reducing water use by greater water efficiency, use of more 
water-efficient plant varieties, or planting less water-intensive crops. While improving 
efficiency in agriculture does reduce overall demand for water, small-scale temporary 
donations, which are subject entirely to corporate decision-making, are not a sustainable 
way of delivering this. When the company decides to stop paying, the measures may 
become unaffordable, even for the chosen few. Moreover, the water saved by these 
schemes may be in different areas to the abstractions, and so does not balance the impact 
in terms of local availability and demand for water. It does not make sense to claim to be 
water neutral on the scale of a sub-continent such as India.  For these water-stressed areas, 
recharge schemes in some other part of India are useless (BBC, 2011; SABMiller, 2012; 
PepsiCo India, 2010; India Resource Center, 2011c; Responsible Research, 2010; Ercin, 
et. al., 2011).   
 PepsiCo and SAB Miller are in effect investing in other producers’ water 
efficiency, but the economic return for the company is a public relations gain, improving 
the company’s public image. This is similar to the carbon offset schemes.   
 One way of reducing the local impact of abstraction is to increase the rate at which 
the aquifer is recharged, so that the amount available for all users is increased.  SAB 
Miller has attempted to offset the water abstraction by its brewery in Alwar, Rajasthan, 
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by funding the construction of water recharge dams in the same locality, which it claims 
will raise the groundwater levels by over 9 metres by recharging about 300m litres of 
water per year – about the same as the annual volume extracted by the brewery.  There is 
as yet no measurement of the actual impact. Coca-Cola has claimed that it has created an 
annual recharge of 1.3 billion litres in Kala Dera, without providing any evidence for the 
figure. Although increasing recharge of aquifers is a genuine way of reducing local water 
stress, these initiatives are not sustainable ways of delivering it. The companies do not 
have any direct economic incentive to fund such recharges - the economic return is a 
public relations gain from being seen to act responsibly. In effect, the incentive for water 
efficiency is created entirely by public campaigns against the abstractions, and by general 
public and political pressure for greater environmental responsibility. Finally, the 
companies themselves decide the scale and nature of the activity, and control the 
measurements, so the possibility of criticism or independent verification is reduced, and 
the actual benefit to the local community and aquifer is hard to verify (BBC, 2011; 
SABMiller, 2012; PepsiCo India, 2010; India Resource Center, 2011c).   
 
 
Global corporate initiatives  
 
This context of conflicts over use of water resources is relevant to understanding why 
companies have been active in trying to shape debate on water resources. This section 
examines three major global corporate initiatives: 
 
 The Water Resources Group (WRG) formed at the World Economic Forum  
 The CEO Water Mandate, under UN auspices 
 The Water Footprint Network 
 
 
The World Economic Forum and the Water Resources Group 
 
The World Economic Forum (WEF), held at Davos, Switzerland every year, is the main 
platform for business discussions of the world economy. Since 2008 it has been used to 
launch a series of reports by a group of multinational companies and others, now known 
as the Water Resources Group. It has also set up projects in India, Southern Africa, 
Mexico and Jordan.   In 2012 it was announced that the group would become ‘a new 
global entity as part of a new international institutional architecture on water to be hosted 
within the International Finance Corporation’ (which is the private sector arm of the 
World Bank) (WEF, 2012a).  
 The framework for this group can be seen in two questions posed at the 2012 
Davos session on “water: scarcity and stress”: “How can governments and industry 
collaborate to ensure that water is distributed and used as efficiently as possible?”, and 
“How can consumers play a role in demanding and driving change?” The first question 
implies that corporations have equal status to governments on water issues, and share the 
single object of efficiency, rather than equality, affordability or sustainability. The second 
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question allows people to exercise influence by buying products – but not by taking 





The table below sets out all the companies which have been members of the WEF group 
at various stages. It also shows which ones have signed up to the CEO Water Mandate. 
Very few are involved in privatised water supply – only Veolia, and perhaps CH2M Hill, 
fall into that category – and companies which dominate that sector, most obviously Suez, 
are missing. The other companies have no obvious interest in privatisation of public water 
utilities.   
 Instead, the majority of companies fall into two clear groups – the ‘consumers’ , 
for whom water is a large input to their business, and the ‘service’ companies, who sell 
products to companies looking to conserve or manage water and wastewater. In the first 
group are the drinks and food companies (D), and the mining companies (M). These are 
the groups involved in the conflicts described in the previous section, and the persistent 
members of the WRG, who also appear in other initiatives such as the CEO Water 
Mandate, are these large consumers – Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Nestle and Unilever. The 
second group includes suppliers of machinery, fertilisers or seeds which can contribute 
to water efficiency in agriculture (A), or water engineering and services companies (W) 
which provide water and wastewater technology and consultancy to others: both of these 
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Table No 4. Corporate membership of WEF Water Resources Group 











Alcan Metals and 
mining 
Canada M X   
Barilla  Food Italy D X   
Cargill Commodities USA  X   
CH2M Hill  Water USA W X x x 
Cisco IT USA  X x  
Coca-Cola Drinks USA D X x x 
Dow Chemical Chemicals USA A X x x 
Halcrow Engineering UK W X x  
Hindustan 
Construction 
Construction India W X x x 
McKinsey Consultancy USA  X x  





USA A X   
PepsiCo Drinks USA D X x x 
RioTinto Mining UK M X x  
SABMiller Drinks USA D X x x 
Siemens Engineering Germany A X  x 
Standard 
Charter 
Finance UK  X x  
Syngenta Seeds, 
pesticides 
Swiss A X x x 
Unilever Food Holland D X x x 
Veolia Water, waste France W X  x 
       
IFC Development 
bank 
   x  
World Wildlife 
Fund  
NGO   X x x 
Sources: WEF (2008; 2012a,b); UN and Pacific Institute (2010a); Public Interest 
Investigations, 2012).   
 
 
In addition to the companies, there are two other important participants. One is 
the IFC, the private finance arm of the World Bank, which in 2012 has become the hosting 
organisation for the group. It thus brings the legitimacy and financial support of the World 
Bank. The other is a large global NGO, the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), which 
features repeatedly in corporate-supported organisations, at global and European level.  
This provides the legitimacy of a civil society organisation as a participant, but one which 
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has strong links with the corporate sector.  WWF is a global association financed mainly 
by individual donations and legacies, but is also financed by companies and aid agencies. 
In 2010 it received €56 million, 11.6% of its donations, from companies and €89 million, 
18.5% of its income, from governments. The WWF also has formal ‘partnerships’ on 
water with some companies, including Coca-Cola, SAB Miller, and IKEA. These focus 
on improving water efficiency in production processes: the WWF gives as an example of 
its success “improving the company’s [Coca-Cola’s] water efficiency 13 per cent since 
2004”.  It also supports corporate positions in water policy at national level. In the UK, 
for example, it has issued a joint statement with the regulator OFWAT on water 
abstraction licenses, which supports the introduction of scarcity charges but also for 
allowing trade in water rights: “Abstraction trading has an important role to play in the 
transition towards sustainable levels of abstraction. Measures that encourage the trading 
of water from lower to higher value uses would increase social and economic benefits to 
society. Trading may become important as a mechanism for responding to the increasing 
variability and uncertainty of climate change impacts” (WWF-INT, 2010; WWF-UK and 





The main function of the WRG has been to produce reports. The first report, ‘Realizing 
the Potential of Public-Private Partnership Projects in Water’ was published in 2008, 
treating the creation of PPPs as an end in itself. It discusses how the Indian Business 
Alliance on Water (IBAW) has been used to promote PPPs in India, and calls for a similar 
agency in South Africa to “help shift the mindset”.  It includes PPPs involving copper, 
gold, coal and uranium mining companies in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and 
Tanzania: “businesses for whom water development is an input to their core businesses” 
(WEF, 2008a).   
 A second report in 2008, “Managing our Future Water Needs for Agriculture, 
Industry, Human Health and the Environment”, outlined the potential problems for 
business and others of water stress, and warns of potential impacts: “What if water 
remains inexpensive for heavy users? What if water prices double? What if water permits 
for agricultural or industrial uses are revoked or restricted in response to scarcity, conflict 
or civil society demands?” It called for a business coalition, centred on agriculture, but 
including also “food, textile,, and chemical companies, companies active as suppliers of 
seed and irrigation equipment, and financial institutions active in financing irrigation and 
other water infrastructure.” The stated objective was to influence political climate on 
water governance issues, including “how water is being allocated”, and specifically “to 
enable more market-based mechanisms” (WEF, 2008b).    
 A third report was produced for the 2009 WEF meeting, entitled “The Bubble Is 
Close to Bursting” in partnership with a group of drinks, food, chemicals, mining, and 
agribusiness multinationals, as envisaged the previous year (WEF, 2009). This group, 
with some new members joining and others leaving, and together with the IFC, 
subsequently formed the 2030 Water Resources Group. 
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 A more substantial report ‘Charting our Water Future’ was written for the group 
by McKinsey & Co in 2009, and has subsequently been treated as a key document at 
international conferences such as the Stockholm Water Symposium. The report develops 
at length an argument that there is a coming ‘gap’ between the demand and supply of 
water, and proposes a number of approaches to bridging this gap.  These are mainly 
technical, involving the use of new technologies to improve agricultural water efficiency 
in particular, but also argues that “It is critical to ensure incentive design emphasizes the 
value of water productivity—for example through clearer ownership rights, appropriate 
tariffs, quotas, pricing, and standards”. The reference to ‘clearer’ property rights implies 
clear contractual rights, which, as seen in the previous section, are often used to override 
the unclear, uncodifed traditional rights (McKinsey & Co., 2009).      
 The section headed ‘Pathways for the private sector’ then identifies the main 
consumers of water, and also the producers of technology and other solutions to improve 
efficiency, including seeds and fertilizer, for whom McKinsey identifies potential 
markets.  This neatly reflects two of the main groups of companies involved in the WRG, 
who stand to gain from greater expenditure on water efficiency. But this market research 
is presented in a misleading chart, ‘exhibit 37’.  This says it shows ‘annual expenditure’, 
with the strong implication that this is expenditure by the companies concerned.  But it 
is not: it identifies markets for these companies, and so the ‘expenditure’ is money to be 
spent by municipalities, farmers and local businesses – not expenditure by the private 
companies in seeds, fertilizers etc., or even investment by these companies. (The ‘exhibit’ 
is also a very distorted presentation of its own figures).12 So when it talks about the 
potential for more government intervention to “make further measures economically 
attractive for the private sector, and thus unlock new investments”, McKinsey is simply 
suggesting that government policies could increase the market opportunities for the seeds, 
fertiliser, etc., businesses – which are strongly represented in the WRG.  The investments 
‘unlocked’ will be in the company’s own production of seeds or machinery – not 
investments in local water systems or conservation of water resources.  The table below 
gives an undistorted presentation of the data in McKinsey’s exhibit 37, from which it is 
clear that 79% of the expenditure it identifies is money to be spent by farmers, the public 
sector and households, and the other expenditure will come from locally established 
businesses, not the seeds, fertiliser, etc., companies. 
 
  
                                                 
12 The ‘exhibit’ is also wildly not to scale – the length of the bars is not consistent with the numbers, neither 
within the same country nor the same category: the bar showing China’s 103 on irrigation systems is longer 
than the bar showing China’s 1,204 on Domestic fixtures and appliances, and about the same length as 
India’s 1,076 on irrigation systems. Fortunately McKinsey’s do not claim it is a ‘chart’, but it is still shows 
remarkable flexibility with data. 
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Table No 5. Potential markets for suppliers of fertilisers, irrigation technology etc. 2010-
2030 (an undistorted rendering of McKinsey’s exhibit 37) (US$ millions) 
 





Total As % 
of 
total 
Local farmers and 
agriculture 
7141 205 28 10 7384 38 
Local industry 287 3585 260 3 4135 21 
Public sector and 
households 
1714 5989 295 147 8145 41 
Total 9142 9779 583 160 19664 100 
Source: PSIRU calculations and McKinsey Exhibit 37 (McKinsey & Co., 2009). 
 
 
This cannot, however, justify the huge leap which McKinsey then makes to the 
conclusion that it:  “empowers the private sector to engage meaningfully on defining the 
institutional mechanisms of the future”. The market analysis simply confirms the well-
known fact that the private sector seeks profitable market opportunities, and would like 
to maximise these opportunities. It certainly does not give such entities the right, in 
democracies, to ‘define institutional mechanisms’.  
 
 
UN CEO Water Mandate: corporate risk, ‘shared’ risk and social risk 
 
The CEO water mandate was launched as a UN initiative in 2007. It therefore predates 
the UN resolution on water as a human right, passed in 2010, but the possibility of such 
a resolution was already under discussion in 2007. The CEO mandate “recognizes that 
the business sector, through the production of goods and services, impacts water 
resources”, and so encouraged companies to endorse the mandate and ‘operate in a more 
sustainable manner’ and give more priority to managing water resources.   It has been 
endorsed by 84 companies, including 14 members of the WEF group, and a number of 
companies in sectors which are heavy users of water such as paper and textiles.  Its 
various reports illustrate the conceptual framework of corporate organisations.  This 
includes the idea of ‘shared’ risk; a fear of political activity; and the acceptance of 
companies as members which have questionable environmental records (UN and Pacific 
Institute, 2010a). 
 The CEO mandate makes frequent use of the idea of risk assessment. This is a 
widely used approach in business strategies, applied to water as it is to any other factor 
of production. There are now a number of online tools and websites created for this (J P 
Morgan, 2008; see also: WRI, 2008; CERES, 2008).  
 The risks for companies are identified as ‘physical risk’, the local scarcity of water 
itself; ‘reputational risk’ to the company’s brand image; and ‘regulatory risk’, of 
restrictions imposed by governments on corporate water use.  The CEO Water mandate 
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documents, the WEF publications and many other business documents on water try to 
extend this approach by talking about ‘shared risks’, shared between companies, 
governments, communities and other stakeholders. But the risks identified in these 
approaches remain risks to the company, not risks to society.  The only one of these risks 
shared with society or the environment is the scarcity of water resources themselves, and 
this is not a ‘shared’ risk but one in which the interests of the companies conflict with 
others.  
 The diagram below, used in a number of CEO publications, expresses this vision 
very clearly. In the diagram, governments, civil society and the water system itself are all 
sources of risk for companies. Companies themselves create no risks for anyone.  
Companies also have no connection at all with the social, economic and ecological 
impacts which stem from the failure of ‘physical water’.  But the whole diagram is 
labelled ‘Shared risks’.  
 
 

























Source: UN –Pacific Institute (2010b). 
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The obvious flaw in this approach is that it fails to acknowledge material conflicts 
of interest between companies and society.  An assessment of risks and opportunities for 
society produces a very different result. This would include physical scarcity, but it would 
also include ‘corporate risk’ – the risk that companies will control water resources for 
their own benefit at the expense of households and local farmers.   
 Regulation also looks very different from a social perspective. For communities 
and ecosystems, regulation is not a risk but a positive opportunity for democratic and 
peaceful limitation of competing (including corporate) behaviour.  By contrast, the CEO 
corporate diagram above has the anti-democratic implication that companies would be 
subject to less risks if there was no democratic government and no civil society.   
  What companies call ‘reputational risk’ is a result of communities asserting their 
interests against those of companies – which is also a positive democratic achievement 
from social and environmental perspectives.  The descriptions of reputational risk in 
corporate publications are clearly describing political activity. A guide for financial 
institutions describes it as arising:  “through tensions and conflict around access to water 
or the degradation of local water resources. In a highly globalised information economy, 
public perceptions can emerge rapidly around business decisions that are seen to impact 
on aquatic ecosystems or local communities’ access to clean water”.  The IFC makes the 
same point: “Risks arising from environmental problems or social discontent surrounding 
a project can be extremely costly in terms of delays and stoppages, negative publicity, 
threats to operating license, and significant unforeseen expenditures” (WWF-DEG, 2011; 
IFC, 2012).   
 Even if a company identifies risks, it does not necessarily avoid them. These risks 
are themselves assessed against opportunities for profit: so even if a course of action is 
identified as creating serious ‘reputational risk’, the company may still conclude that such  
a risk is acceptable if, for example, admission of moral responsibility or discontinuing 
the operation would lead to greater losses to the company than the cost of lost reputation. 
This business decision assigns no value to the interests of others. This is one reason why 
the concept of a ‘human right to water’ is so ‘sensitive’ for companies (UN and Pacific 
Institute, 2010c).   
 
 
Dow Chemical as a model company 
 
The booklet on ‘Corporate Water Accounting’ includes a highlighted example of good 
practice involving one of the companies which has endorsed the CEO Water Mandate, 
Dow Chemical (“In 2006, the Dow Chemical Company used the WBCSD Global Water 
Tool and GEMI Water Sustainably Planner as the bases for a water-related risk 
assessment for all of its facilities worldwide”) (UN and Pacific Institute, 2010c).   
 This choice of Dow Chemical raises interesting issues as to what is compatible 
with being a member of the CEO Water Mandate.  The company was the principal 
manufacturer of napalm, used as an anti-personnel chemical weapon, and Agent Orange, 
a powerful herbicide used as a weapon in the US-Vietnam war, being sprayed onto forests 
and crops.  Dow Chemical is also now the parent of Union Carbide, the company whose 
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factory in Bhopal, India, killed 25,000 people in a poisonous gas explosion in 1984.  The 
Indian government is seeking to re-open a lawsuit for damages over the Bhopal 
explosion, in response to which Dow states (as at November 2011) that although it owns 
Union Carbide, it is not responsible for any of its liabilities; that even Union Carbide 
“itself is not liable for claims related to the Bhopal tragedy….[that] the Indian courts do 
not have jurisdiction over [Dow] in this matter ….. [Dow] as a legal entity has never done 
business in India”. Dow’s sponsorship of the 2012 Olympic Games has been challenged 
by campaigners, not only on the basis of the 1984 disaster, but also claiming that: “27 
years of ground-water and soil pollution from toxic waste dumped while the factory was 
in operation. That toxic waste has never been removed from Bhopal and continues to 
pollute the environment today”.  Dow notes media reports of groundwater tests, and refers 
to a 2010 assessment which Dow says is consistent with findings “that all groundwater 
samples tested were within drinking water standards”. The campaign dares the organisers 
of the 2012 Olympic Games to drink water from Bhopal. Dow has also paid a fine of 
$325,000 to settle an action by the US Securities and Exchange Commission alleging that 
a Dow pesticide subsidiary in India paid bribes of over $200,000 to Indian officials to 
‘expedite the registration’ of its products (Dow, 201; Close, 2012).     
 
 
Aqueduct: a global database of corporate risk 
 
The limitations of the corporate approach to risk can also be seen in the ‘Aqueduct’ 
project’.  Coca-Cola has provided a global database for this project (also sponsored by 
Goldman Sachs, Dow Chemical, General Electric and Bloomberg), in which their 
collaborators are the World Resources Institute, Aqueduct bills itself as measuring and 
mapping water risk, but the notes explain that it is limited to “measuring business risks 
posed by water, thus drawing out elements that are relevant to business and financial 
institutions”. So Aqueduct uses the same categories of physical, regulatory and 
reputational risk (WRI, 2012).     
 This focus is not neutral, as can be seen in the way it treats the environment, and 
the way it values public debate. It does not yet (as at March 2012) include indicators on 
the impact on ecosystems. One commentator concerned with the eco-system of the Rio 
Grande River in New Mexico, USA, noted that under Aqueduct’s criteria “the Rio Grande 
might score well for risk mitigation precisely because of the unsustainable engineering 
that has so dramatically harmed the river's natural functions”. This was confirmed in an 
Aqueduct response, which added that: “An interesting area for further research might be 
looking at how an ecosystem approach to resilience management can reduce corporate 
water risks” (WRI, 2012).   
 Aqueduct says it plans to add indicators on eco-systems, though it is not clear if 
this will be done in the global dataset supplied by Coca-Cola. One of the proposed 
indicators is on groundwater trends, where the data itself may be contested.  Another 
proposed indicator would fall under “regulatory and reputational risk” because of its 
influence on regulation and public scrutiny. As in the above diagram, the environment 
itself is seen as a potential source of risk, not a concern in itself (WRI, 2012).  
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 The database at present has just two indicators on regulatory and reputational risk, 
one of which is ‘media  coverage’, defined as “the number of media reports per capita 
covering water-related concerns...which reflects the level of awareness of the public and 
media on water and how companies are handling this resource. Higher values indicate 
greater awareness of water issues”, which is a fine description of a lively and well-
informed democracy.  But the database treats these higher values, this greater awareness 
as “translating to business risks”, such as regulation, critical press, and lawsuits. For the 
WRI/Coca-Cola database, greater public awareness is a risk-creating problem –less 
public awareness and less media coverage, is better (WRI, 2012). 
 
   
Water Footprint Network 
 
A company’s ‘global water footprint’ is an analysis of all the water inputs to all the 
components in the supply chain of a product to see how much water is consumed in the 
whole production chain. This can then be used to find ways in which the water input, and 
the cost, can be reduced.  The Water Footprint Network, which promotes the idea and the 
techniques for carrying it out, has been set up by the IFC and supported by various 
corporate and non-corporate partners, including, as usual, Coca-Cola, Nestle, PepsiCo, 
SAB Miller and Unilever (The Water Footprint Network, 2012).    
 The idea originally comes from the use of ‘energy footprints’, which enable 
companies to cut their use of energy. This is not only useful to the companies in reducing 
the real costs of energy - it is also useful in combating climate change, because reducing 
the demand for energy also reduces the emission of CO2, and so helps combat global 
warming. It also helps reduce demand for fuels such as oil and coal, stocks of which are 
becoming depleted. However, there is no such global benefit from companies reducing 
their water footprint. Using water does not directly produce CO2 emissions, so reducing 
water use does not affect climate change. And the world’s supply of water is not being 
depleted: there is the same amount of water on the planet regardless of Coca-Cola’s 
production policies.  
 It is also unlikely to deal with the problem of impacts which create conflicts with 
local communities. The easiest places where a company can reduce its footprint are 
unlikely to be the places where they are already in conflict with users. Coca-Cola have 
identified over 300 litres of water in their global footprint for every litre of the final drink, 
but it is only the single litre for the final drink which is abstracted in the bottling plants 
in India which conflict with the interests of those specific communities in India. Reducing 
water used by the farmer growing the sugar does literally nothing to reduce Coca-Cola’s 
demand for the final litre at the bottling plant. The general point is well stated in a CEO 
water mandate paper: “the baseline responsibility of companies is to ensure that their 
activities do not infringe on the enjoyment of the right of access to water.....a company 
that does not respect the right of access to water in one community where it operates 
cannot compensate for that failure by having an extensive philanthropic/CSR program 
elsewhere” (Tripathi Jason Morrison, 2012). 
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 The concept of the global footprint is very attractive for companies. If companies 
do reduce the water consumed by their products, it will at least do no harm. It can only 
enhance the reputations of companies which make the footprint commitment. And it is 
also something that companies can do while continuing to ignore the interests and rights 
of communities with whom they are in conflict.  
 
 
The human right to water 
 
The UN resolution and its origins 
 
In complete contrast to this technical and economic ideology from the corporate 
initiatives is the concept of a ‘human right to water’.  One source was the concern for the 
living conditions of the poor, especially in peri-urban slums whose inhabitants lacked 
official property rights or tenancy rights, and as a result were being denied access to urban 
services including water. The UN Commission on Human Rights was persuaded to agree 
a comment to the effect that there was a human right to water and sanitation, thus 
providing important support for slum dwellers and others.  
 At the same time, many rural and indigenous movements, especially in Latin 
America, were demanding that their rights to local water resources should be recognised, 
to protect these resources against the impact of mining and agribusiness corporations.  
 The worldwide resistance to privatisation of public water supplies also adopted 
the argument that water services should not be put in the hands of private companies 
because the need for water and sanitation was too important and too fundamental for it to 
be dependent on commercial decisions based on profitability. These last two groups, in 
particular, formed coalitions to get the human right to water adopted in national 
constitutions, as it was in the first democratic constitution of South Africa in 1994. 
Following a referendum, Uruguay included the right to water in its constitution, followed 
by other countries, including Bolivia.  
 This process culminated on 28 July 2010, when the United Nations General 
Assembly agreed Resolution 64/292, which recognized the human right to water and 
sanitation and acknowledged that clean drinking water and sanitation are key factors to 
the accomplishment of all human rights. The motion was moved by Bolivia, but a number 
of OECD countries tried to avoid the vote being taken, and considered opposition. In the 
end, the resolution was supported by 122 states, and opposed by none, with 41 abstaining 
(UNGA, 2010).   
 The notion is now used by many groups at local, national regional and local levels 
to support a range of different positions, reflecting the range of social movements 
involved in its development.  These include demands for extension of water supply as a 
public service, or for eliminating or reducing charges for water, or to reject privatisation 
and commercialisation, or to assert that human consumption has priority, or that local 
subsistence farming has priority, or to insist upon traditional customs of water 
governance.  
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 The common element in these positions, and the concept itself, is the assertion of 
equality, not only of equal needs to a fundamental element of life, but also of equal 
political power – democracy – and of equality before the law. This challenges the 
corporate position described above, because it implies that conflicts will be resolved by 
democratic politics, not by markets and the ‘allocation of water to higher value uses’. 
Water is to be governed by human rights, not corporate strategies. It also challenges the 
corporate reluctance seen in the case studies above, to acknowledge the rights of others, 
or even to respect judicial decisions which uphold those rights. As a result, the corporate 
response has been confused and hostile. 
 
 
Human rights and policy capture 
 
Following the UN decision in 2010, the CEO Water Mandate produced a paper on water 
as a human right (UN and Pacific Institute, 2010d). It does not treat it as a new 
opportunity for businesses to demonstrate their commitment to this new right.  Rather, 
the paper refers to “the sensitive nature of this topic”, the “uncertainty” of business 
responsibilities, and the “concerns” and “caution” of companies.  Even in a confidential 
survey, only two of the companies endorsing the mandate formally acknowledged the 
human right to water.  This was due to fears that others may use the ‘right to water’ to 
impose constraints on business activity: “hesitancy toward a formal corporate policy on 
the human right to water in many cases is driven by the ill‐defined landscape of 
stakeholder expectations regarding what actions and outcomes will constitute a legitimate 
and fulfilled commitment to respect the human right to water”.  
 The CEO Mandate itself keeps ‘ill-defined’ society at arm’s length. Even the 
section on ‘Community Engagement’ only commits the companies to : “Endeavour to 
understand the water and sanitation challenges in the communities where we operate and 
how our businesses impact those challenges” and even this is limited by the phrase 
“where appropriate, over time” (UN and Pacific Institute, 2010a).    
 Apart from this corporate nightmare of an ‘ill-defined landscape’ swarming with 
people with non-commercial agendas, the paper makes no mention of democratic 
political processes, and avoids altogether mentioning the possibility of  conflicts of 
interest. Instead, it prefers to talk of: “shared social, political, environmental, and 
economic risks facing civil society, companies, and governments”. With no apparent role 
for democratic decision-making, and no possibility of the public interest conflicting with 
corporate interests, the implication is that public policy can always be aligned to 
corporate policies, and so it is only normal to expect governments to support corporate 
positions. 
 This may be one reason why the paper warns against the danger of “policy 
capture”, and in particular the dangers that some company activities “might be perceived 
as inappropriate or unlawful by certain stakeholders due to concerns of policy capture”.  
The CEO Mandate is very aware of this issue.  Its Guide to Responsible Business 
Engagement with Water Policy includes a definition of the process: “Policy capture exists 
where organizations unduly dominate a policymaking process to an extent that excludes 
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or subdues other stakeholder views, resulting in policy that favors narrow vested interests 
to the detriment of the public good”.  It warns that the appearance should be avoided as 
much as the reality: “Stakeholder concerns of corporate policy capture are perhaps the 
largest barrier to companies playing a meaningful and responsible role in the 
development and implementation of water policy” (UN and Pacific Institute, 2010b). 
This anxious resistance to the concept of a human right to water can be contrasted 
with the response of the companies whose business is private operation of municipal 
water services. For these companies, conflict over rights to water resources are much less 
important than conflicts over the issue of privatisation itself. Public opposition to 
privatisation often uses the concept of a human right to water as one reason against it 
being subject to commercial operators, and so it is a powerful weapon in these political 
struggles. For the private water companies, it is therefore more important to try and blunt 
the use of this weapon by persuading people to reject the idea that privatisation is in 
conflict with human rights. And so the response of the private water companies to the 
UN resolution was very different: their global association, Aquafed, immediately issued 
a press release headed ‘Private Water Operators celebrate the recognition of the Human 
Right to water and sanitation by the United Nations General Assembly’, which even 
claimed that they had been “working actively with the United Nations and many other 
stakeholders for a decade to ensure that the Right to Water and Sanitation is recognized” 





The starting point of this report was that the corporate interest in water is based on from 
the economic function of water as an input to the companies’ activities, manufacturing 
drinks and food, mining and oil exploration, and agribusiness. This economic use of water 
brings companies into conflict with communities where local water scarcity is created or 
exacerbated by the commercial activity. The resolution of these conflicts involves 
political and legal processes, and ideas and ideology matter in these arenas. Companies 
have an interest in promoting ideas which   
 The global corporate initiatives discussed above have been extremely successful. 
They have mobilised the economic and media resources of the companies themselves, 
the World Economic Forum, the World Bank and others, and these resources draw in 
NGOs and academic and other experts as well.  This money – much of it public money – 
sustains a significant global community of people with a common agenda including 
shared risks, allocation of water resources to higher value uses, and global water 
footprints.  
 By contrast, communities in conflict with the same companies over water 
resources, have no remotely comparable resources. Yet the ‘human right to water’ has 
won the powerful backing of the UN, is widely referred to in local conflicts, and has a 
high level of public legitimacy. The global level corporate hegemony thus may have little 
local value. Just as the corporate ‘global water footprint’ has no relevance for its impact 
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at any specific location, so global ideological dominance may be less significant when 
dispute resolution always happens at the local level. 
 It remains possible in principle for companies to choose local strategies which 
recognise human rights and specific water rights of local communities, and accept that 
decisions will made by democratic institutions through open public debate. Companies 
in conflict over water resources, however, make a different judgement. As the Aqueduct 
database insists, public debate and public awareness are seen as threats. The company in 
each individual case makes an economic assessment of options, which consistently do 
not favour recognising human right to water or public democratic decision-making. 
Corporate lawyers can deliver a better return by denying liability, challenging the 
legitimacy of courts, and endlessly delaying the final outcome of court cases (e.g. Dow 
Chemical in Bhopal, Chevron in Ecuador), than they can by recognising rights and 
engaging in public negotiation. The economic return from ‘policy capture’, by providing 
economic and other incentives for politicians to support the corporate position, is more 
reliable than engaging in political processes in the public domain.  
Political contests over privatisation in the water sector itself have largely been 
won by social organisations. It still remains unclear if corporate interests will dominate 
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Global water  
 
The total volume of water on Earth is about 1.4 billion km3.  This volume does not 
change: the world is not running out of water. It is not a ‘depletable’ resource like oil or 
gas. Water is constantly recycled through rivers to the sea and then by evaporation to 
form clouds and return again as rain or snow. 
 
 





Most water (97.5%) is in the sea, and not fit for drinking or irrigation. Of the 
remaining freshwater: 
 
• 70% is in the form of ice and snow in mountains and Arctic/Antarctic 
• Nearly 30% is in underground aquifers (“groundwater”) (10.5 billion km3) 
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Chart D. Water  
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Global use of water 
The biggest use of water in developing countries, and in the world as a whole, is by 
agriculture for irrigating fields. Only 8% is consumed by households. In high income 
countries, industry is the biggest user, accounting for nearly 60%.  
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Water scarcity and water stress 
 
 
Chart F. Water availability in different regions 
 




Chart G. Water stress 
 
Source: Source: UNEP (2012b). 
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Chart H. Differential impact of climate change 
 
 Source: Source: UNEP (2012c). 
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Corruption and public services 
 
 
David Hall,1 Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU) University of 
Greenwich  
 




Introduction and summary 
 
Corruption is much more than a moral issue. It undermines public services and 
democracy. When citizens have to pay bribes to get healthcare or fair policing, or 
contracts are awarded to those who pay bribes, it threatens society as a whole. Corruption 
wastes public money by diverting it into the hands of corrupt politicians, businesses and 
their agents. It perverts public policy decisions, by buying decisions which suit the 
interests of the rich and powerful elite. It steals wealth from countries and places it in tax 
havens for the benefit of corrupt individuals. 
 One set of problems concerns the extent to which individual public employees 
demand bribes from the public to provide the service they are entitled to. This undermines 
public services. It needs to be eradicated by implementing employment practices, 
including pay, which minimise the temptations to corruption and maximise the incentives 
to ethical behaviour.  
 The bigger problems concern the corrupt networks of senior officials, politicians, 
and domestic and foreign businesses. Government contracts and privatisations are at the 
heart of these systems. Policies which favour privatisation also create the conditions 
which are most favourable to corruption.  
 Corruption is often discussed as though it was a problem only in developing 
countries. It is blamed on the countries themselves for having poor ‘cultures’ which 
tolerate corruption. This is contrary to the evidence which shows that the overwhelming 
majority of people in all countries are strongly intolerant of corrupt practices. 
 Donors and international institutions like the World Bank like to portray 
themselves as supporting ‘anti-corruption’ initiatives. In practice, their policies favouring 
privatisation provide greater incentives and opportunities for corruption. Moreover, 
donor countries and the World Bank have actively discouraged developing countries from 
prosecuting multinational companies for corruption.  
 Ending corruption requires public and political organising to demand that political 
leaders represent public interests, not the interests of rich individuals and powerful 
                                                 
1 E-mail: halldj@gmail.com. 
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companies, and to hold them accountable. Transparency, accountability and public 
participation are key elements in this, as are strong and independent systems of audit, and 
courts prepared to prosecute, fine and ban corrupt companies and officials. 
 


























“Petty” corruption: bribes for services 
 
One kind of corruption is when people are expected to pay bribes in order to get the 
service they are entitled to from a public employee. The employee is making use of his 
or her position to get extra income, at the expense of citizens or the service itself. Typical 
examples are the payment of bribes to water workers to record false meter readings; to 
health workers for providing treatment at an earlier date; or to customs officials to allow 
goods to be smuggled without paying duties. 
 This is sometimes described as ‘petty corruption’ to contrast it with the ‘grand 
corruption’ of large-scale fraud by politicians and companies. It seriously damages public 
services. Citizens are cheated. It breaks the principle of fair and equal treatment. It 
undermines the integrity of public servants. Those who most need services find 
themselves having to pay as if the service was just a matter of private profit. What should 
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be a public service is converted into another commercial transaction. It also weakens 
public resolve to tackle bigger corruption. It must be eradicated. 
 The best-known picture of corruption is the index published by Transparency 
International (TI) which ranks countries “according to their perceived levels of public-
sector corruption” (Transparency International, 2011a). Developing countries 
consistently appear as the most corrupt, and OECD countries as least corrupt. The 
problem of corruption is thus presented as a problem of the third world, and specifically 
of corrupt public employees. It is often incorrectly attributed to the culture of these 
countries being much more tolerant of corruption than the cultures of the OECD 
countries.  
 The index – and the analysis – are unsatisfactory. The index is not based on actual 
experiences or documented cases of corruption. It is based on the perceptions of people 
who participate in surveys. The survey participants consist almost entirely of business 
executives, consultants, or unspecified ‘experts’ many of whom are foreign, and 
businessmen some of whom may themselves have paid bribes or be part of corrupt 
networks. The perception of international business executives is not a reliable indicator 
of the culture of ordinary people.2  
 In fact, surveys of the public in various countries show that very few people, in 
any country, believe that corrupt behaviour is acceptable. Overwhelming majorities in 
Eastern Europe, and over 90% of Africans believe it is unacceptable (Razafindrakoto and 
Roubaud, 2010; Rose and Mishler, 2010; Cockcroft et. al., 2008). By contrast, there is 
clear evidence of a corrupt culture amongst executives themselves in rich countries. A 
2012 survey found that 24% of financial sector executives in the USA and the UK 
believed that they had to engage in illegal or unethical activity in order to be successful 
(Labaton Sucharow, 2012). The evidence does not support the view that there are 
distinctive corruption-tolerant cultures in developing and transition countries. 
 The great majority of people surveyed in developing and transition countries do 
think that corruption is a big problem in their country (Cohen, 2012) In many states, 
people have anything but good experiences with the authorities when it comes to securing 
their and their families’ basic needs. In these countries people are often forced to give 
and receive assistance from relatives, friends, or members of their community. Without 
good governance, without functioning, transparent public services equally accessible to 
all, giving gifts or money is often the only way people can obtain health care, building 
permits, court decisions and so on. 
 There is strong evidence that the most important factor affecting the extent of 
petty corruption is the pay of the workers concerned. When pay is too low to provide the 
necessities of life, or where it is significantly lower than the pay of other people with 
similar qualifications, then corruption is used as a way of making extra money. Studies 
in countries as diverse as Madagascar and Ukraine show that inadequate civil service pay 
is linked to petty corruption. In a number of Asian countries, water meter readers 
                                                 
2 The data sources for the TI index are described in “Corruption perceptions Index 2011: Long 
Methodological Brief”, which is in a zip file at 
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/313/1264/file/CPI2011_DataPackage.zip. 
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demanded bribes when their pay was below subsistence levels, but not after their pay was 
increased substantially. This has been known for a long time – customs officials in 18th 
century England were accepting bribes from smugglers because they were paid so little 
(Payne, 1772; Keane, 1995).   
 This basic material factor is key to reducing the incentive for corruption. Effective 
disciplinary and criminal sanctions provide further deterrence. Building and maintaining 
confidence in effective and democratically accountable public services depends on more 
political actions – especially addressing the problem of ‘grand corruption’ Where there 
is a lack of confidence in the state itself, people may fall back on informal mechanisms, 
including reliance on friends, family and the economic reliability of petty corruption. 
 
 
State capture and privatisation 
 
‘Grand corruption’ by political and business elites is a significant threat to democracy 
and sustainable development. It involves the payment of bribes to gain contracts and the 
purchase of political influence. There are three key features that set it apart from ‘petty 
corruption’:  
 
• It involves systematic networks as well as individual bribes. 
• Privatisation, including outsourcing of government contracts, forms a core 
part of business - politician relations. 
• Multinational companies, based in the rich countries which are supposedly 
‘clean,’ are playing a huge and extensive role in the corruption process. 
 
 
State capture and legal corruption 
 
The concept of ‘state capture’ was introduced by two World Bank researchers to describe 
the situation in some of the former communist countries of eastern Europe. They found 
that firms were deliberately adopting strategies of networking to influence government 
officials and politicians to change the laws and regulations in their favour, and partly 
accomplished this through corrupt payments (Hellman et. al., 2003).   
 One example of this kind of network developed in Italy in the 1990s. Politicians 
from various parties, on the one hand, and groups of companies on the other hand, agreed 
to allow the companies to share out the contracts amongst themselves, and decide on the 
prices. The companies agreed to pay enough money to keep the politicians happy, and 
for the money to be shared amongst all the parties involved. Middlemen were brought in 
to launder the money and keep the payments secret. The whole system was a way of 
gaining and sharing power and money, at the expense of democracy, transparency and 
public accountability (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999). 
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Chart B. Networks of corrupt exchanges 
 
Source: Della Porta and Vanucci (1999), p. 22 
 
 
There is evidence of similar systems in other countries. In Ireland, an inquiry 
found that Charles Haughey, prime minister between 1979 and 1992, had “devalued the 
quality of a modern democracy” by accepting about €11 million in cash from wealthy 
business people over a period of 17 years, concealed through a network of offshore bank 
accounts (Guardian Unlimited, 2006). Such networks also exist in a number of 
developing countries, including Nigeria, where governments have developed corrupt 
relations with both local businesses – who are favoured with the proceeds of privatization 
– and multinationals, such as oil and electricity companies.  
The interface between politicians and businesses is now seen as similarly corrupt 
in many more countries. 
 Nearly three-quarters of Europeans think corruption is a major problem in their 
country, and in the institutions of the European Union itself. They have clear views on 
where the corruption is taking place: 47% think that the most corrupt actors in the system 
are those who award contracts. The most frequently cited explanation for corruption is 
that “there are too close links between business and politics” (Eurobarometer, 2011).  
 In India, according to a 2011 report by KPMG, even Indian businesses agree that 
the major problem in India is not petty corruption (‘bakshish’) but rather: 
 
• “Scams to the tune of thousands of crores (one crore = 10 million rupees) that 
highlight a political/industry nexus ……a web of companies and middlemen,” 
based on the willingness of the private sector to pay bribes.  
• More than two-thirds of businesspeople (68%) admit that corruption in India 
is initiated by the private sector, and 42% say that bribery is considered 
‘acceptable’ in their sector.  
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• The sectors identified as most corrupt were those where government contracts 
or privatisations are at stake – construction, followed by telecoms, with public 
services in third place, just ahead of the financial sector and defence.  
 
These networks use illegal payments (bribes), but also build ‘networks of 
influence’ through legal payments – donations to political parties, or employing lobbyists 
to convince politicians to adopt certain policy positions. For the companies, it is a 
rewarding business strategy. It “involves efforts on the part of private interests to rent 
access and influence within well-institutionalized policy processes, often through 
political figures acting as middlemen” (Johnston, 2005).  In developing countries, firms 
which spend money on lobbying get a bigger boost to their profits than firms which 
simply pay bribes (Nauro and Giovannoni, 2007; OECD, 2007; Economic Times, 2009). 
In the USA, companies with political connections get more contracts after an election in 
which they backed the winner. In the UK and USA, banks have spent tens of millions on 
lobbying to prevent tighter regulation (The Guardian, 2012).  
 These legal ways of buying influence work in the same way as illegal ‘corrupt 
exchanges’ such as bribes: “conceptually, legal corruption may be quite close to its illegal 
counterpart…. [and] many rich countries (G7 and OECD members) seem to be 
challenged cases as far as legal corruption is concerned” (Kaufmann and Vicente, 2011). 
The UN Convention against Corruption includes ‘trading in influence’ as improper, but 
so far many states – including the Netherlands and Switzerland – have opted out of 
treating it as a criminal offence (European Union, 1999; Wempe, 2010).  
 State capture is thus not just a matter of criminal behaviour – much of what 
happens is constructed to be legal. It is a political problem, whereby public decision-
making structures are captured for commercial interests. Government contracts or other 





Privatisation, in all its forms, provides great incentives and opportunities for corruption 
and state capture.  
 
• The sale of state-owned industries is a one-time opportunity to buy a 
profitable business, so investors have an incentive to pay bribes to increase 
their chances of getting it, and for a lower price. 
• A long-term concession for water services, or a power purchase agreement for 
a private power station, or a PPP, is also a one-off chance to win a stream of 
government-backed revenue lasting 25 or 30 years, and so there are the same 
incentives to pay bribes.  
• In all forms of outsourcing, whether it is refuse collection, construction, 
cleaning or medical services, contractors may pay bribes or form cartels or 
both in order to win profitable business.  
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Bribes or political donations form the currency with which these benefits are 
obtained, as summarised by the Nobel-prize winning economist Paul Krugman (talking 
about the USA): “As more and more government functions get privatized, states become 
pay-to-play paradises, in which both political contributions and contracts for friends and 
relatives become a quid pro quo for getting government business… a corrupt nexus of 
privatization and patronage that is undermining government across much of our nation” 
(Krugman, 2012).   
 The author of a recent book on corruption in the EU says liberalisation is playing 
a similar role in Europe, where EU policies of extending the internal market have created 
more opportunities and incentives: “What the EU has done is allow corruption through 
its policies of increasing economic competition within the single market, including 
regulation of competition in the public procurement sector” (Warner, 2007).   
 These links between privatisation and corruption exist in a range of different 





The influence of the pharmaceutical companies on political processes is visible at global 
and national levels. This has a direct impact on health services. The effect is to divert 
large sums from public budgets for healthcare, and to undermine democratic policy-
making. 
 At the global level, the multinational GSK persuaded the United Nations’ World 
Health Organization (WHO) to declare that swine flu had reached the level of a 
‘pandemic’ – even though the WHO’s own rules did not justify this – and to recommend 
the use of Tamiflu as the best form of prevention. This led many countries to purchase 
huge quantities of Tamiflu, made only by GSK. In some cases they spent 1% to 3% of 
their national public healthcare budget to purchase the drug. The WHO had been advised 
by academics and others who had financial interests and connections with GSK (BIJ, 
2010; 2012a).  
 In Bulgaria, the pharmaceutical company, Sopharma was privatised in September 
2000. Its owner became a member of the supervisory board of the National Health 
Insurance Fund (NZOK). Another manager became health adviser to the cabinet and 
helped draft a new law which created more favourable conditions for the privatised 
company. By 2011, Sopharma supplied more than 70% of the medicines to public 
hospitals. It charged three times more for its drugs in Bulgaria than it did in Turkey. 
 In the USA, three multinationals have been fined huge sums of money for corrupt 
marketing or mis-marketing of their drugs. AstraZeneca paid $520 million, Pfizer paid 




Privatisation by outsourcing has become widespread in central government, and in the 
process increased the problem of corruption. The size of many central government 
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contracts, especially in defence procurement and construction, creates greater incentives 
for companies to operate corruptly in order to get business.  
 SGS has been used by the World Bank and others to spearhead the privatisation 
of customs and other central government functions – despite this company itself being 
involved in high-level corruption. In 1996, it emerged that SGS had paid bribes to obtain 
a government contract for inspection services in Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto and her 
husband were convicted of paying bribes, and they fled the country. No action was taken 
against SGS. In 2012, the Pakistani Supreme Court demanded action to prosecute SGS, 
but still no case has been brought. The company was even a panellist at Transparency 
International’s anti-corruption conference in 2010, under the title of ‘Business principles 
for countering bribery: An effective tool for the private sector?’ (SGS, 2010). 
 There is extensive corruption associated with USA contractors in Iraq in relation 
to security contracts funded by the USA federal government. Senator Leahy tabled a new 
bill on 4 January 2007 to combat war profiteering and public corruption, citing “mounting 
evidence of widespread contractor fraud and abuse in Iraq…. At least 10 companies with 
billions of dollars in U.S. contracts for Iraq reconstruction have paid more than $300 
million in penalties since 2000 to resolve allegations of bid rigging, fraud, delivery of 
faulty military parts and environmental damage. Seven other companies with Iraq 
reconstruction contracts have agreed to pay financial penalties” (US Federal News, 
2007). The scale of losses from this USA-led corruption is significant. Nearly $9 billion 
in Iraqi oil revenues could not be accounted for. The cash was flown into the country by 
the USA in shrink-wrapped bundles and then distributed without any adequate 
accounting (The Guardian, 2006).  
 The UK government has even proposed to outsource procurement services in the 
Ministry of Defence, so that a private company would handle all the tendering for defence 
equipment. This provides obvious further opportunities and incentives for corruption. In 
January 2012 four employees of a private company providing procurement services were 
convicted of fraud because they had sold confidential information to companies tendering 
for work. One of the multinational companies which advertises itself as a manager of 
procurement services is KBR (http://www.kbr.com) – a company which has had to pay 
$579 million to settle a prosecution in the USA for corruption. Major defence contractors, 
such as Babcock, see this as an opportunity to by-pass normal procedures of competitive 
bidding and instead become long-term ‘partners.’ As Geoff Allum, analyst at Arden 
Partners states, “A radically different MoD procurement structure will provide Babcock 
with a once in a lifetime opportunity. There is every chance that the MoD will move away 
from self-delivery and towards outsourcing, coupled with a preference for closer, 
partnership-style relationships with the private sector. No one is better placed than 





Municipal and local governments globally have outsourced various functions. These 
include refuse collection, where contracts have been the subject of long-term systematic 
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corruption by private companies in a number of countries, including the USA and Italy. 
Outsourcing is now often introduced on a wider scale, which encourages further 
corruption. 
 For example, Malawi introduced the so-called ‘new public management’ as 
advised by international institutions, in the belief that it would foster accountability, 
transparency and good governance. In practice it has created a breeding ground for 
corruption at the local government level, as a result of greater contracting-out, 
decentralisation, user fees, public-private partnerships (PPPs), and local discretion in 
spending without accountability. Contracts were awarded to senior officers and 
councillors and their relatives and friends, even when the service was not needed. 
Councillors used decentralisation to justify paying themselves larger expenses, or to 
simply embezzle money. ‘User fees’ were taken as personal income, as though they were 
bribes, and used as a pretext for extorting bribes. Public–private partnerships were created 
as networks to give privileged information about contracts (Tambulasi, 2009).  
 Local government is also vulnerable to corruption by multinational companies. 
The largest USA retail multinational Wal-Mart is subject to a number of court cases and 
investigations over corruption of local government planning officials in Mexico to gain 
a commercial advantage. According to the New York Times: 
 
Wal-Mart de Mexico had orchestrated a campaign of bribery to win market 
dominance. In its rush to build stores the company had paid bribes to obtain 
permits in virtually every corner of the country (Barstow, 2012).   
 
 
Electricity and water 
 
Valuable long-term contracts and concessions in the electricity and water sectors provide 
a powerful incentive for corruption. There have been widespread payments of bribes by 
companies to gain power purchase agreements for independent power producers (IPPs), 
as well as bribes by water companies, on every continent. 
 
• The ‘Gorilla’ file is a transcript of lengthy eavesdropping by the Slovak 
Intelligence Service (SIS) during 2005 and 2006. It was leaked at the end of 
2011. It records a series of meetings involving leading Slovak politicians and 
executives of the private equity firm Penta, and others. The meetings largely 
concerned the payment of bribes by the multinationals involved in various 
privatisations, and the allocation of these bribes to individuals and parties. The 
discussions mostly focused on the privatisation of electricity and gas, but also 
involved healthcare, district heating, airport, and water. The energy 
multinationals mentioned include RAO UES (Russia), Enel (Italy), E.on and 
Siemens (Germany) and EDF (France). Regarding the latter, the transcript 
says, “The problem is that EDF as a state company cannot pay the commission 
[bribe] directly, but through the consultancy firm EPIC 
[http://www.epicinvest.com]” (EurActive, 2012).   
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• In the water sector, courts in France have convicted executives and public 
officials for bribes paid by Suez and Veolia subsidiaries in the cities of 
Grenoble and Angouleme and the island of Reunion. A 1997 report by the 
Cour des Comptes, France’s national audit body, said that the system of 
‘delegated management’ on which Suez and Veolia built their national 
dominance was systematically flawed. “The lack of supervision and control 
of delegated public services, aggravated by the lack of transparency of this 
form of management, has led to abuses.” In Milan, Italy, in 2002 a senior 
executive of Vivendi (now Veolia) was convicted of planning to bribe local 
politicians in both the majority and opposition parties of city council in order 
to win the tender for a wastewater treatment plant in the south of Milan. The 
evidence included a floppy disk containing a letter by the Vivendi executive 
Alain Metz stating that he has “excellent contacts” within the right wing 
majority coalition (Polo delle Liberta, whose leader was Silvio Berlusconi), 
and planned to pay about €2 million to politicians, half of which would go to 
the majority parties, and the rest to the opposition and other “experts” and 
“mediators” whose names were not revealed.  Both groups “have come under 
scrutiny in a host of criminal and civil cases, with accusations that include 
bribery of public officials, illegal political contributions, kickbacks, price 
fixing, operating cartels and fraudulent accounting” (Cour des Comptes, 





The role of multinational companies in these corrupt networks is already obvious from 
the examples above. The table below, listing the companies which have had to pay the 
largest penalties under the USA anti-corruption law, shows that they include some of the 
biggest companies in the world. One remarkable feature of this table is that, according to 
Transparency International, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany are three of the 
supposedly ‘cleanest’ countries in the world, yet each one has two companies in the list 
of top ten settlements for international bribery charges in the USA (World Bank, 2009; 
Bloomberg, 2010; WikiLeaks, 2010; Transparency International, 2011b). 
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Table No 1. Multinationals charged in USA with international corruption: largest 
settlements (US$) 
1 Siemens  Germany  $800 
million  
 2008 
2 KBR/Halliburton  USA  $579 
million  
 2009 
3 BAE  UK  $400 
million  
 2010 
4 Snamprogetti Netherlands/ENI 
SpA  
Netherlands/Italy  $365 
million  
 2010 
5 Technip SA   France  $338 
million  
 2010 
6 Daimler AG  Germany  $185 
million  
 2010 
7 Panalpina Switzerland  $82 million  2010 
8 ABB Ltd  Switzerland  $58 million  2010 
9 Pride  USA  $56 million  2010 
10 Shell  UK/Holland  $48 million  2010 
Source: FCPA Blog (2012). 
 
 
Table No 2. Multinationals from OECD countries recently barred or sanctioned by the 
World Bank 
Macmillan UK 6 year ban 2011 
Oxford University 
Press 
UK Probation, subsidiaries banned for 3 
years 
2012 
Alstom France Probation, subsidiaries banned for 3 
years 
2012 
Crown Agents UK 6 month ban 2011 
Source: World Bank (2012); Crown Agents (2012); Trace (2012). 
 
 
It is no surprise to see Siemens at the top of this list. It has been repeatedly 
prosecuted in the last 15 years in Germany, Singapore and elsewhere for both corruption 
and cartels. While it paid a large penalty in the USA, the World Bank decided it was ‘too 
big to debar’ from contracts, and so only asked for a donation to anti-corruption causes. 
But Singapore did debar Siemens for five years, in 1996. 
 The case of Siemens demonstrates that corruption by a multinational company 
can be a systematic part of their business strategy over many years. Secondly, this is made 
easier by the assumption that a company from a country perceived as ‘clean’ could not 
behave in such a way. Thirdly, the enforcement mechanisms of international institutions 
and northern countries are not effective against such a company – it is ‘too big to be 
punished.’ Fourthly, the enforcement mechanisms of southern countries are more likely 
to be applied to such a company. 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers                                                                                                             
Thematic Area Series SATCUASPE – TA3 - Urban Water Cycle and 
Essential Public Services – Vol. 3, No 5 
 
Castro, José Esteban (Ed.)  
  
 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 






The limits of existing initiatives 
 
In dealing with the problems identified above, existing ‘anti-corruption’ initiatives by 
international institutions have limitations. These international initiatives share an 
overwhelming concern with achieving a ‘level playing field’ for international business, 
where no single corporation should be at a competitive advantage by paying a bribe which 
its competitors cannot, or will not, match. Reducing the role of public services is not a 
concern for them, indeed privatisation provides greater business opportunities. Nor are 
they principally concerned with weakening democratic decision-making because 
companies can obtain better deals from weaker governments. In attacking corruption, 
they often do not want to see national legal systems used to sanction multinational 
companies, but rather to keep such powers of sanction for the home governments who 
can often be persuaded to take a light touch approach. 
 This difference in approach means that many of the existing initiatives fail to 
solve the problems. Some of the policies of these institutions worsen the situation, in 





The World Bank advertises itself as a leading anti-corruption actor. The empirical 
research by the World Bank Institute into state capture and corporate bribe-paying has 
provided valuable evidence on the processes of state capture. Its power to debar 
companies from bank projects is a significant potential deterrent to corrupt activities. 
 There are three major problems with the bank’s activities in relation to the 
problems identified above. 
 The first is that it promotes privatisations, and provides loans linked to these 
privatisations. This creates conditions favourable to corruption and increases the amount 
of money available to be captured, as in the case of Nigeria. “There was evidence to show 
that an estimated US $36 billion in annual revenue from the sale of petroleum and gas 
and annual huge loans from the Western lending agencies continued to be used for corrupt 
purposes. Despite this evidence, the World Bank and the IMF, in particular, violated their 
lending policies by continuing to lend more money to successive corrupt Nigerian 
regimes” (AFRODAD, 2007). 
 This problem also arises from the activities of other international financial 
institutions and donors. The implementation of conditions can itself require corruption. 
A former president of Argentina, Fernando de la Rua, was put on trial in August 2012 for 
allegedly paying $5 million in bribes to senators in the year 2000 to pass a bill allowing 
companies to cut the hours and working conditions of their employees. The IMF had 
made this law a condition for the continuation of its loan to Argentina (Deutsche Welle, 
2012). The UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID) uses 
the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), which acts as a private equity 
fund, to promote privatisation. The Crown Agents, another UK state body, acts as a 
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private contractor to run public finance systems in developing countries. Both bodies 
have been implicated in corruption and fraud. 
 Secondly, international institutions have discouraged developing countries from 
using their own legal systems to punish multinationals. Two key episodes occurred in 
Pakistan and Indonesia, where donors and development banks actively insisted on the 
sanctity of contracts, and fought (successfully) to prevent legal action against corrupt 
privatisations. In Indonesia, after the overthrow of the dictatorship of Suharto, the USA 
and the World Bank fought hard, successfully, to prevent Suharto’s corrupt private 
energy deals from being terminated, and instead insisted that these corrupt contracts 
should be honoured in full. They threatened to withhold further aid or loans until 
Indonesians backed down. In Pakistan, the IMF, World Bank and the British government 
all threatened to withhold loans or aid unless the country dropped its prosecution of a 
mainly British-owned private electricity company. 
 Thirdly, the World Bank has failed to use its full power to debar corrupt firms 
from working on its contracts. These debarments have been applied to many firms, with 
substantial effect, but when it was faced with the prospect of debarring Siemens in 2009 
it took the view that the company was too big to punish. Siemens was instead allowed to 





The OECD anti-bribery convention commits member countries – that is, the richest 
countries in the world – to introducing legislation to criminalise bribery practiced 
overseas by companies based in OECD home countries. The convention was most 
strongly supported by the USA, which believed that its companies were at a disadvantage 
in competing for international business from governments, because they were deterred 
from paying bribes by the USA’s own Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), while those 
from other countries were not inhibited by similar legislation.  
 The major problem with the OECD initiative is that the member states have 
limited incentive to convict and punish their own multinational companies. There have 
been long delays in introducing legislation required under the convention, and little 
effective use of such legislation. The decision by the UK government in 2008 to abandon 
its prosecution of BAe, and instead accept a payment from the company, illustrates this 
weakness. BAe successfully lobbied government ministers to drop the case, arguing that 
it was in the UK national interest that they should be free to carry on their business 
globally (The Corner House, 2008).  The fact that the USA has used its own FCPA to 
prosecute many multinationals based in other countries – including BAe –indicates that 
the USA also does not believe that other OECD countries are effectively applying the 
legislation required under the OECD convention. 
 The OECD initiative was intended to demonstrate that developing countries do 
not need to prosecute multinationals for corruption, because the home countries of the 
multinationals would do so themselves. The initiative has failed to achieve these 
objectives because the level of prosecutions, outside the USA, is very low. One indication 
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The USA introduced the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 in reaction to scandals 
over bribes paid by its companies abroad. The act and prosecutions under its provisions 
have had a positive impact in affecting the behaviour of USA firms. Since 2009, the 
number of such prosecutions has increased, and been extended to cover USA subsidiaries 
of European multinationals. 
 The greatest weakness is that the great majority of cases are settled by the 
company paying large sums to the courts in exchange for the case being dropped. It means 
that the evidence collected for these cases is rarely heard in public, companies are not 
debarred from future contracts, other governments do not see evidence which they could 
use to debar the companies, and the payments made by companies are often quite small 
in relation to the economic gains from the bribes. 
 Major USA companies, led by the USA Chamber of Commerce, are currently 
lobbying to weaken the law, specifically so that bribing officials of state-owned 
companies is not an offence.  
 
 
Transparency International (TI) 
 
Funded by the World Bank, donor countries, and a number of multinational corporations, 
TI bills itself as an “international movement.” It is the best known organisation dealing 
with corruption, and organises an annual anti-corruption conference. 
 The most publicised product of TI is its ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’, which 
ranks countries. The weaknesses of this have been discussed above. TI now also publishes 
a ‘Bribe payers index.’ This focuses on the businesses that pay bribes. This index suffers 
from the same limitations and some new ones. The report does not name companies in 
its index. It simply ranks the countries in which companies are based, according to the 
perceived tendency of businesses from that country to pay bribes.  
 This leads to absurd results. The 2011 index said companies from the Netherlands 
are the least likely to pay bribes, only one year after the largest Dutch multinational – 
Shell – paid a $10 million fine in Nigeria over corruption charges, and admitted to US 
diplomats that oil companies pay bribes to top Nigerian politicians. The same index rated 
the fourth cleanest country as Germany, only a year after the largest German 
multinational – Siemens – paid hundreds of millions of dollars to both the World Bank 
and the USA over widespread corruption for many years.  
 TI’s connection with multinational companies severely limits its credibility. Its 
supporters originally included Enron and Arthur Andersen, both of whom collapsed as a 
result of non-transparent accounting and Enron’s corrupt activities. For example, Shell is 
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one of TI’s ‘supporters.’ The TI reports for 2011 do not mention any of the major 
corruption cases involving Shell during the previous two years. 
 The same shortcomings are evident in the structure and practice of the Water 
Integrity Network (WIN), which was set up in 2006 by TI and others to promote anti-
corruption activity in the water sector. There have been many cases of corruption in this 
sector, most of them involving the water multinationals Suez and Veolia, a number of 
them in their home country of France. WIN then accepted a new member and sponsor, 
Aquafed, a global lobby organisation representing the water companies. The 2008 annual 
report of TI, jointly prepared by WIN, had a special focus on corruption in the water 
sector. In 288 pages, this report does not once mention either Suez or Veolia. Its country 
chapters do not cover France, the scene of the greatest concentration of corruption 
investigations in the water sector in the previous 15 years (Hall, 2004; Aquafed, 2006; 





Self-regulation and private auditors 
 
Companies consistently prefer self-regulation on corruption, and reject outside scrutiny. 
They argue that their accounts are already externally audited, and that internal systems 
will be sufficient to prevent the company from paying bribes. 
 However, the track record of accountants in this role is poor. Company accounts 
are scrutinised by external auditors, who are expected to identify and report serious 
financial problems. But they have a strong incentive not to do so, because the company 
is their client, and they fear losing business if they report or publicise problems, including 
bribes. German prosecutors have been investigating whether KPMG Germany ignored 
questionable payments on Siemens’ books. They suspect that employees at Siemens 
funnelled hundreds of millions of dollars into slush funds over several years to bribe 
potential customers (Market Watch, 2007).  
 The failure of company auditors was also highlighted in the financial crisis of 
2007 and 2008, when major banks and financial institutions became insolvent and were 
rescued at huge expense by taxpayers. Not one of these disasters had been spotted in 
advance by their auditors. Over 28 financial companies – in the UK, USA, Germany, 
Iceland, The Netherlands, France or Switzerland – received clean bills of health from 
their auditors just days before they were demanding state aid to protect them from 
bankruptcy. The cases involved all the big international accounting firms, who 
subsequently were paid by governments for advice on how to be alerted to such problems 
in future (Sikka, 2009). 
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A number of countries have introduced legal protection for whistle-blowers. Whistle-
blowers are seen as key sources of information for public prosecutors. Protecting them 
creates a deterrent because companies are aware of the risk of exposure from inside. The 
USA has strengthened this further by providing rewards for whistle-blowers where their 
information leads to prosecutions. 
 However, whistle blowing depends on individuals making decisions, in isolation, 
based on the individual person’s conscience. It does not systematically develop greater 
accountability, transparency or public participation in the political process as a whole. 
The individuals themselves also remain vulnerable, even when there is legislative 
protection. In the USA, the whistle-blowers who exposed fraud committed by the private 
companies such as WorldCom have said they feared for their lives (McKenna, 2011).  
The UK Department for International Development inadvertently publicised the name of 
a Nigerian who exposed corruption connected with UK funds; as a result he had to flee 
Nigeria. An employee at the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) who revealed massive 
corruption at the bank spent the rest of his life poor and frequently unemployed 
(Ledergerber and Fontana, 2011; BIJ, 2012b).   
 While whistle blowing is a valuable source of information, the protection of the 
individuals themselves remains weak and should be strengthened. 
 
 
Women and corruption 
 
In 2001, an academic study found that a higher proportion of women in parliament was 
linked to lower levels of corruption. Another found that women were more likely to 
condemn bribery and less likely to offer bribes. The same year, a World Bank report 
argued that societies where women have greater rights and a greater presence in public 
life are less corrupt and more efficient, and so gender equality was itself a way of reducing 
corruption. Another more recent study, published in 2011, also found that a higher 
proportion of women in a country’s legislature and labour force is linked to a lower level 
of corruption. This evidence has been used to argue that women are intrinsically more 
altruistic than men. The Finnish government has argued that its low level of corruption is 
partly due to the prominent role of women in Finnish society (Dollar et. al., 2001; Swamy 
et. al., 2001; World Bank, 2001; Samimi and Hosseinmardi, 2011; Goetz, 2007; Sung, 
2012).   
 These findings can also be explained by the fact that stronger democracy results 
in greater participation by women, and suggest that it is the democratic improvements 
which reduce the level of corruption – not the gender of the individuals involved. It is 
true that women are less involved in corruption, but this too can be due to the fact that 
they have fewer opportunities to be corrupt, and have much less access to the powerful 
networks which are the vehicle for most corruption. Where public employees demand 
bribes, it is usually linked to inadequate pay. For that reason, hoping that the employment 
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of women will by itself reduce corruption is another way of saying that women are more 
likely to accept pay below subsistence levels (Goetz, 2007). 
 The anecdotal evidence is not consistent. It is easy to find examples of women 
standing up against corruption – for example, Dilma Roussef, President of Brazil, has 
been prepared to operate a ‘zero tolerance’ policy against leading members of her own 
party who are corrupt. But it is also easy to find examples of extremely corrupt practices 
by women. For example Shirley Porter, a former leader of Westminster Council in the 
heart of London, deliberately used municipal loans to persuade voters for opposition 
parties to move out of the council’s area.  
 A new study, using data from countries with more than 99% of the world’s 
population, has now established the distinction between the political and gender factors 
very clearly. Better democracy – stronger rules of law, and stronger political rights – are 
very strongly linked to lower levels of corruption. When these institutional effects are 
taken into account, the higher proportion of women in public life is not by itself 
statistically significant: 
 
Achieving an advanced state of liberal democracy and/or strengthening liberal 
and democratic institutions over time are both validated explanations of 
corruption prevalence and consistent predictors of changes in corruption over 
short periods of time…. The association between women in government and 
corruption constitutes a typical example of spurious correlation (Sung, 2012).   
 
Greater transparency, stronger law enforcement, greater democratic rights are 





This section sets out a series of measures to deal with the problems of public service 
corruption, state capture and corrupt multinationals described above. They are evidence-
based. There are well-established examples of their use and effectiveness. They include 
a much stronger dimension of social, political and union organisation than is usual in 





The single most important solution to the problem of corruption by public service workers 
is paying a proper living wage. As noted earlier, successful attempts at reforming water 
services where corruption was a problem, for example in Cambodia and Bangladesh, 
have included doubling the wages of the workers responsible for meter readings and 
household connections.  
 The same point was made in the 18th century by Tom Paine, when he submitted 
a pay claim for the customs officials of England. He pointed out that corruption and 
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incompetent staff were leading to a loss of revenue and argued, “the most effectual 
method to keep men honest is to enable them to live so…. An augmentation of salary 
sufficient to enable them to live honestly and competently would produce more good 
effect than all the laws of the land can enforce…. The officers would be secured from the 
temptations of poverty, and the revenue from the evils of it; the cure would be as 






Relations between workers and communities, and the status of workers in relation to 
communities, can play a crucial role in improving a service and reducing the incidence 
of petty corruption. It increases mutual respect and confidence, and by-passes the senior 
officials and contractors who are often the driving force behind corrupt practices.  
 
There are examples of the positive effects of this approach: 
 
• Water and sanitation workers on a slum project in Ahmadabad (India) were 
exposed to regular contact with local communities and NGOs. This public 
exposure strengthened community scrutiny of possible attempts at corruption, 
and also created stronger commitment by the workers to supplying poor 
households with network services. The level of corruption was far lower as a 
result, with contractors complaining that they cannot get contracts on the 
project from bribery, and the relationships generated a positive cycle of 
gratitude from local inhabitants, and consequent pride by employees: “At the 
end [of each project] we feel that we have really accomplished something. 
People give us so many blessings. We see and feel this sentiment” (Davis, 
2004).   
 
• Workers on a rural water supply project in Azad and Jammu (Pakistan) were 
expected to work unusually closely with the communities, and formed close 
bonds with them: villagers reciprocated by calling them ‘‘heroes’’. One junior 
engineer said that “we will go where no one else will go. We will work late 
into the evenings, we work on Sundays, we work with the people, we don’t 
exclude them. This is how we are seen by the people”. There was very little 
corruption, with attempted bribery rejected by workers both because of 
project rules and because of “the trust that had developed between the staff 
and villagers” (Davis, 2004).      
 
• A great improvement in public service delivery in Ceara, Brazil, in the 1990s 
was based on the same approach. Instead of following the cynical view of 
neoliberalism that “the public servant is presumed guilty of self-interest unless 
proven otherwise”, the government deliberately built on the commitment of 
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its workforce. Workers were given  a larger and more varied set of tasks than 
normal, especially in developing closer connections and responsiveness, 
which created trust and respect , “contrasting with traditional development 
advice which restricts workers’ discretion to the programme specification.” 
The process also professionalised the public service, appointing new 
employees by open competition, not by patronage. As well as improving 
services, these new relationships almost eliminated corruption, sharply 
reducing the re-election rate of mayors known to be corrupt. The government 
actively promoted the public image of the workers, and at the same time 
encouraged communities to expect the best and most honest performance 
between workers. The process was a complete contrast to the treatment of 
workers encouraged by ‘new public management’: 
 
“Government itself fed the high dedication of these workers with repeated public 
demonstrations of admiration and respect for what they were doing. It publicised the 
programmes incessantly, even their minor successes. It gave prizes for good 
performance, with much pomp and ceremony…All this contributed to a new respect 
for these workers by the public – remarkable in a time of widespread contempt for 
government…..Communities were actively encouraged to make demands on public 
authorities and their workforce…. the government urged communities to act as 
monitors: “this programme is yours and it is you who will determine its success… 
make sure that those who are chosen abide by the rules … if these rules are breached 
… we want to hear about it” (Tendler, 1997).   
 
 
Meritocracy and civil service 
 
The creation of an independent civil service – appointed on merit to ensure that policy 
advice and public services were provided objectively, and not by politicians – was a 
crucial step in building European and other states in the nineteenth century. It has been 
equally important in building effective states and public services in developing countries 
today. The economic successes of Asian countries such as South Korea were made 
possible through an effective state system based on a meritocratic civil service which was 
‘embedded’ in government but at the same time ‘autonomous.’ Countries such as Brazil 
and India have also built success with some level of meritocracy in the civil servisse 
(Evans, 1995).  
 The absence of this is a problem, especially in countries where the state lacks 
public confidence. Central European countries including Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and 
Slovenia have failed to establish an independent civil service, and deliberately made 
political appointments easier, so that each party which comes to power expects “to staff 
the most important public administration offices with party members and associates as 
well as their own friends and acquaintances, without examining their professional 
qualifications” (Gadowska, 2007; Bugaric, 2008)   
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 Changing such conduct by enforcing merit-based recruitment is an important way 
of protecting and advancing quality public services. It is also important to promote 
sustainable development and to oppose corruption: 
 
A competent and meritocratic core civil service, autonomous from clientelistic 
networks and at the same time responsive to society characterised by… long-term 
career outlooks. These traits make civil servants more professional and more 
detached from powerful rent-seeking groups attempting to influence them. A 
competent, meritocratic and ‘results-oriented’ core bureaucratic system is a key 
ingredient in avoiding state capture and other forms of predatory behaviour (Fritz 
and Menocal, 2006).   
 
The use of consultancy contracts, exchanges, and units staffed partly by business 
representatives within government all have similar effects. They undermine the integrity 
of the civil services and provide greater opportunity for legally-engineered influence and 
capture of key government policies. Examples include:  
 
• In the UK, the management consultancy McKinsey & Company has gained 
£14 million in contracts to advise on health service reforms which will open 
up the health service to even more work for private firms. McKinsey staff 
move in and out of the Department of Health, and the firm offers hospitality 
to government officials including hosting meetings of government policy 
teams (Mail Online, 2012).   
• In Germany a ‘staff exchange programme’ between civil servants and private 
businesses was introduced in 2004, initially without public knowledge, so that 
civil servants could “increase understanding of their concerns and interests” 
(Polk, 2011).    
• In many countries, there are now PPP units within finance ministries, which 
include business representatives, endowed with powers to promote the use of 
PPPs by government. Such practice gives business interests excessive 
influence over decisions, with major long-term implications for public 
finances. 
 
Building an independent civil service committed to national and public interests, 
with appointments based on merit, free of political patronage, with a secure career 
structure and pay and conditions reflecting their responsibilities, remains key to dealing 
with corruption. Such a civil service is strong enough to resist the demands of corrupt 
networks. The privatisation of policy-making must be ended.  
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The connection between privatisation and corruption reinforces the need to oppose 
privatisation. Both the sale of public companies and the outsourcing of public work create 
further opportunities for corruption.  
 There are already many cases of successful anti-privatisation campaigns around 
the world, in a wide range of sectors. The most successful campaigns have involved 
broad-based movements where unions and social movements have worked together to 
prevent or reverse privatisation efforts 




Public audit and freedom of information 
 
A strong public audit function is of the greatest importance in fighting corruption. A good 
example is the recent work of the audit commission of India, the CAG. This body has 
played a key role in exposing the cost of the corrupt sale of coal and telecoms licenses to 
private companies, including Essar Power, part of one of the biggest companies on the 
London Stock Exchange. In 2012, CAG reported that the government allocated coal 
licenses for $36 billion less than their true value – equivalent to an entire year’s income 
tax revenues. In 2010, it reported that a similar amount had been lost by corrupt allocation 
of private telecoms licences.  
 The need for strong public audit is actively promoted in Latin America by the 
Iniciativa TPA, an international body that actively encourages civil society organisations 
to promote transparency, public participation, and accountability in public audit systems 
in Latin America (REI, 2012). It has identified key problems with audit institutions, 
including the common refusal by audit institutions to release information publicly, partly 
due to a culture of secrecy and partly through fear of disclosing information (Maurino et. 
al., 2010).   
 Audit reports must be disclosed and published to unleash democratic political 
demands for action against corruption identified by auditors, and to protect the auditors 
themselves: 
 
Through the peer pressure of societal control and increasingly assertive civil 
society organizations … mobilizing political power is often more important than 
increasing technical capacity … [an]external audit can be a dangerous endeavor 
in inauspicious political contexts (Santiso, 2007).    
 
Ending corruption thus requires strengthening democratic participation, and 
protecting the independence and integrity of audit institutions and their staff. Unions and 
Public Services International are well placed to contribute to both elements, through 
participating in active campaigns for information and protecting workers involved in 
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audit. “We must provide a shelter for the work of public auditors and protect them from 
the usual custom of ‘shooting the messenger’” (REI, 2011).   
 The Iniciativa TPA is supported by ULATOC (www.ulatoc.org), an organisation 
of workers involved in public sector audits in Latin America. Founded in 2004, it has 
members from countries across Latin America, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Paraguay. Many PSI affiliate unions are members of 
ULATOC. The organisation has formed links with similar organisations in Spain, Italy, 
France, Belgium and Luxembourg, and with representatives of workers in the EU Court 
of Auditors. It works with other organisations to strengthen the role of auditors, and to 
protect the professional independence and integrity of workers in public audit institutions, 
including the network of Latin American experts in public control REI (2012).   
 Freedom of information legislation plays a similar crucial role. In this case, it is 





Effective legal and disciplinary sanctions are necessary to deal with all forms of 
corruption. Singapore is not a model of democracy, but it does provide an example of a 
series of policy measures which are effective. These include the creation of an 
independent civil service, whose salaries were repeatedly increased to keep pay in line 
with the private sector, on the grounds that “the government has to be able to persuade 
talented Singaporeans to join politics and the civil service and to motivate them to behave 
ethically and rationally for the national interest.”  
 At the same time there is an extremely strict and firmly enforced regime of 
penalties for corrupt behaviour, which applies to both top-level and ‘petty’ corruption, 
and to both public employees and private companies, foreign as well as local. The anti-
corruption agency has powers to investigate bank accounts and expenditures. The 
penalties include five year jail sentences and fines of $100,000. 
 These laws have been enforced rigorously against multinationals. In 1996, a 
middleman was convicted of paying bribes totalling US $9.8 million on behalf of his 
multinational clients. The government reacted by banning all five companies – Siemens, 
Pirelli, BICC, Tomen, and Marubeni – from bidding for any government contracts for 
five years. “The ban applies to all government projects. Firms associated with the five 
companies, any new company that the firms may jointly set up, and firms that share the 
same directors as the five are also debarred” (Reuters, 1996). 
 These systems of sanctions can be replicated elsewhere. It requires a commitment 
to building and supporting a strong public service, and a readiness to apply powerful 
sanctions against the most powerful politicians, officials, and businesses, including 
foreign companies.  
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Popular action and campaigns 
 
The problem of state capture requires a political response. Technical solutions are not by 
themselves sufficient if the government which controls the administration is itself 
captured by the interests these mechanisms are supposed to control. 
 There is a wide range of political actions that may address the issue of capture. 
The most striking recent examples are the uprisings of the Arab Spring, in which 
privatisation and corruption were key issues. Other actions include broad-based 
campaigns, especially those which try to mobilise the public around the issues of 
democracy, transparency and accountability. 
 
 
Uprisings against corrupt privatisations: the Arab Spring 
 
The Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 were prompted, in part, by widespread popular 
reaction against corrupt privatisations carried out by the ruling elites over many years. 
These privatisations were encouraged by international financial institutions and the EU. 
Years of trade union actions against privatisation laid the foundations for the popular 
revolts in Egypt and Tunisia.  
 A top army general, quoted in April 2011, attributed anger at Egypt’s privatisation 
programme, involving the transfer of billions of dollars worth of public assets to private 
hands, as aiding the Egyptian revolution that toppled the Western-backed Hosni Mubarak 
from power (IPS Cairo, 2011).   
 In Egypt, the first massive demonstrations in Tahrir Square, on 25 January 2011, 
were sparked by a plan to privatise social insurance. A series of strikes by public workers 
and workers in privatised companies organised by independent unions of the newly-
formed Egyptian Federation for Independent Unions (EFIU) were pivotal in forcing 
Mubarak to step down. This was followed by a strong campaign to stop the privatisation 
program and reverse the corrupt deals which had already been carried out, including a 
series of court cases brought by the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights 
(ECESR) over corrupt privatisations (el-Hamalawy, 2011; Ahram Online, 2012).   
 In July 2011, the interim Egyptian government terminated the privatisation 
programme. By September 2011 the courts had renationalised four companies: Omar 
Effendi, Egypt’s “flagship” department store, Shebin El-Kom Textile Company, the 
Tanta Company for Linen and Derivatives, and the Steam Boilers Companies. The courts 
noted that these corrupt privatisations had been made because they were required by 
international financial institutions in order to secure loans. The court found that the 
companies were sold at prices far below their true value. In June 2012 the courts 
convicted Mubarak himself of corruption but acquitted his sons – to widespread public 
outrage (The Laws of Rule, 2011).  
 The international financial institutions continue to promote privatisation. In early 
2012, the European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD) strategy declared 
that privatisation and liberalisation under the Mubarak dictatorship had been successful, 
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and promoted further privatisation of water, roads and electricity. Egyptians, including 
the new independent unions, continue to oppose this.  
 
 
Tax havens campaign – ATTAC Norway (& global chapters) and Fagforbundet 
 
In order to avoid detection by tax authorities or criminal investigations the proceeds of 
corruption need to be hidden and tax havens are frequently used for this purpose because 
of the secrecy they provide. An innovative campaign on tax havens is emerging in 
Norway and in many other countries that can help make corruption more difficult as well 
as reducing tax avoidance. ATTAC Norway is working with the public service union 
Fagforbundet and municipal governments in a new campaign demanding that 
multinational suppliers sign a disclosure that they don’t put profits into tax havens. 
Apparently some suppliers have already dropped out of procurement bidding on these 
grounds. The Norwegian Finance Minister is supporting the campaign with a pledge to 
require companies to file country-by-country financial reports by 2014 (Jorde, 2013).   
 
 
South African unions campaign against corruption 
 
In 2012, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) launched a public 
campaign against corruption together with affiliates and civil society organisations. The 
municipal workers’ union, SAMWU, had long argued for this. Its members have been 
active in exposing corruption at the municipal level across the country “because 
corruption has been a decisive factor in thwarting effective service delivery to many of 
our most impoverished communities” (Politics Web, 2011).   
 Corruption Watch runs an interactive website, www.corruptionwatch.org.za, an 
SMS-line and a call centre to report corruption in both the public and private sectors in 
South Africa. It focuses on exposing and ending corruption in service delivery – for 
example, police extortion of money from motorists – and the grand corruption of private 




Conclusions and summary of recommendations 
 
Defending public services against corruption and capture 
 
This analysis of corruption finds different conclusions from the official international 
bodies. Instead of being concerned with creating a low cost ‘level playing field’ for 
international business, the focus should be on creating quality public services and 
preventing public policy from capture by commercial interests. 
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 Fragmenting, minimising and under-funding the public sector is part of the 
problem of corruption in service delivery. The solution involves recognition of the value 
of civil and public services and the workers who provide these vital services.  
 The ‘culture of corruption’ which is so prominent in the minds of international 
businesspeople is angrily rejected by the majority of public opinion everywhere. It is 
privatisation, and the uncritical support for it by donors and development banks, which 
systematically creates unnecessary opportunities and incentives for corruption and policy 
capture. In addition, the commercial capture of the state through ‘legal’ corruption via 
political donations, influence trading, lobbying and infiltration of public institutions, 
undermines the power of democratic decision-making. It corrupts public policy decisions 
and public resource allocation. 
 Exposing corruption requires extra powers and autonomy for public audit bodies, 
strong freedom of information legislation to empower civil society organisations, and 
concerted campaigns for democratic financial decision-making, transparency and 
accountability. Relying on individual whistle-blowers or an improved gender balance, or 
self-regulation by the corporate sector or its private accountancy firms are not viable 
solutions on their own.  
 National courts should be able to apply powerful legal sanctions – including 
imprisonment and debarring from tendering – against corrupt elites and local and 
multinational companies alike, rather than simply excluding northern companies from the 
rule of law in countries where they operate, permitting companies to buy off prosecutions 
by making donations, or suppressing information of value to the public interest by 
confidential court settlements. International bodies and donors should support these 
powers by closing down the tax havens that protect the corrupt and the public monies 
they have stolen.  
 Finally, technical solutions are not the full answer. The effectiveness of combined 
actions against corruption depends on strengthening democratic and community 
organisations within every country, and developing strong links between unions and 





Public service workers and political integrity: 
 
• All public service workers should be paid a decent living wage sufficient to 
remove incentive for corrupt exploitation of their position. 
• Appointment, career progression, discipline or dismissal of civil and public 
service workers should be immune from political decisions,  
• All public employees should be subject to a disciplinary code which includes 
strong sanctions against corrupt practices. 
• Commercial capture of public interests: 
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• Public policy-making should not be outsourced to consultants. Private 
consultants or business interests should not be appointed to bodies responsible 
for public policy decisions or assigning public contracts, such as PPP units. 
 
Privatisation, outsourcing and procurement: 
 
• International banks and donors should not require any form of privatisation as 
a condition of aid or loans. 
• Procurement processes for goods or services should be completely public and 
transparent. 
• A company should be banned from tendering for any public contract if it, or 
its parent or subsidiaries or associates, has been convicted of corruption in any 
country, or uses tax havens. 
 
• Public audit and freedom of information: 
• Public audit bodies and their staff should have strong protection from political 
or commercial interference. 
• Public audit bodies should have strong powers to require disclosure. 
• Public audit bodies should be enabled and required to publish and publicise 
their findings and encourage public responses. 
• Freedom of information legislation should require disclosure to all citizens of 
all categories of information about public finances, including civil service 




• National courts should have power to sanction any multinationals operating 
in the country. 
• Sanctions for corruption should include long-term barring from contracts of 
companies and any parents, subsidiaries, associates or successors, for long 
periods of time. 
• The use by nationals or companies of tax havens should be banned, and/or 
any company which is part of a group that uses such tax havens should be 
excluded from future tendering. 
• All corruptly-gained monies should be recovered and returned to the public 
treasury. 
 
Democracy and community: 
 
• Open interaction between public service workers and communities and civil 
society organisations should be encouraged and promoted. 
• Increased public participation should be systematically developed to promote 
gender equity and financial accountability in public service budgeting and 
policy decisions. 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers                                                                                                             
Thematic Area Series SATCUASPE – TA3 - Urban Water Cycle and 
Essential Public Services – Vol. 3, No 5 
 
Castro, José Esteban (Ed.)  
  
 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 








• Some of these strategies can be pursued at the international level, including: 
• Demanding that the World Bank, IMF and other development banks and 
donors drop all privatisation conditions. 
• Supporting international initiatives e.g. member states of the OECD to 
facilitate prosecution of multinational companies for corruption offences, 
including prosecutions in home countries such as USA or Netherlands. 
• Working with campaigns such as those led by ATTAC and the Tax Justice 
Network to close down tax havens.  
• Joining with national and international campaigns to implement strong 
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